Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34. (1981)
BRIDGE, Francis Roy: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century
266 Francis Roy Bridge part, had certainly no wish to continue the war merely in order to expel Russia from Armenia167). Indeed, it was the fear of precisely this sort of sweeping demand that had made Pallavicini argue from the start against accepting Turkish military assistance in the main theatres of the war. True, he now admitted that if Austria-Hungary refused to accede, her position in Turkey would suffer; and the Germans were privately assuring him that the obligation was largely illusory: Germany would be guided in the end by her own interests168). Even so, when the foreign minister, Burián, asked him for his advice, Pallavicini persuaded him that in no circumstances could Austria- Hungary negotiate a formal treaty like the German one: it was not merely that Austria-Hungary had ‘während des Krieges nicht genügend Ellbogen- Freiheit, um mit den Türken verhandeln zu können’; it would be unwise to undertake any further commitments to a Turkey that would in any case have to lose territory at the end of the war169). Similarly, when the Germans slightly extended their obligations to assist Turkey against Britain, in May 1917, Pallavicini again warned of the danger that Turkey might intentionally provoke a conflict, for example, for the reconquest of Bagdad, ‘und es wäre ein Weltkrieg entbrannt wegen eines rein türkischen Interesses’ 17°). Nor did he like the German promise of October 1917 to prevent the imposition of restrictions on Ottoman sovereignty, such as local autonomy in individual provinces of the empire, at a peace conference: this would give Turkey far too much power to hold up peace negotiations171). Perhaps it was indeed the case, as the German ambassador said, that Berlin did not take these promises seriously, and that many people there already believed ‘daß die Türkei für diesen Krieg die pots cassés werde bezahlen müssen’. That only raised the uncomfortable question, ‘ob Verträgen auch juridische oder nur rein politische Bedeutung zukommt’172). At any rate, 1917 closed with Pallavicini and his new chief, Czemin, firmly determined to delay the whole question of Austria-Hungary’s formal adherence to the modified treaties until the war was over173 *). Meanwhile, the domestic activities of the Constantinople government continued, as before the war, to work against any really close co-operation between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire. True, Pallavicini, instructed by Burián in November 1915 to raise the question of the deportation of Armenians, tried to avoid an open quarrel. He tactfully reminded the grand vizir that the Armenians were among the most industrious elements in the empire; but he had to point out that if the allies were accused of en167) PA I 522: Burián to Hohenlohe, 30 September 1916. 16S) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Burián, No. 74A-P, 29 September 1916. 169) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Burián, telegram 537, 9 November 1916. 17°) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Czemin, No. 39, 8 May 1917. 171) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Czemin, No. 93P, 17 November 1917. 172) Ibid. 173) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Czernin, No. 10P, 8 December 1917; Czemin to Pallavicini, telegram 525, 12 December 1917.
