Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34. (1981)

BRIDGE, Francis Roy: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century

Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire

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True, there was some anxiety lest a partition of Asia Minor between the other Powers might mean the end of the open door, with deleterious consequences for Austro-Hungarian trade; but, as Berchtold emphasized to Palla vicini, the essential point was that the Monarchy must not be the only power to come away empty handed when the day of partition arrivedls0). He had no luck with his approaches to Italy and Germany who had already, with Turkey’s blessing, staked out their interests over the whole area where Berchtold was hoping for economic concessions; and it was in vain that he appealed to their sympathy as allies: it was particularly serious ‘daß ein Ausschluß der österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie von einem Gebiete, auf welchem sämtliche anderen Großmächte Boden gefaßt haben, eine solche Macht- und Prestige-Einbuße für die Monarchie bedeuten müßte, daß darunter die Dreibundinteressen selbst eine schwere Schädigung erleiden würden’ lsl). Meanwhile, the Turks calmly explained that the concessions in question had already been given to others151 a), and by July Berchtold was reduced to talking of putting pressure on Constantinople by joining Germany in supporting Italy in her long wrangle with the Turks over the implementation of the Treaty of Lausanne. This elicited a cry of pain from Pallavicini: as the grand vizir had recently declared that Turkey regarded only Italy, of all the powers, as her enemy, there was a danger of making Austria-Hungary ‘äußerst verhaßt’ at Constantinople, and of driving the Turks into the arms of the Entente Powers* 151 152).

That Berchtold should even consider intervening in a remote and tedious legal dispute, humouring Italy at the risk of further estranging Turkey, was partly a reflection of the Serbian crisis and the looming prospect of a European war. But Austro-Turkish relations as such had hardly improved either in 1914. Pallavicini might muse153) about the possibility of some day using a regenerated Turkey, freed from its European and Asian encumbrances, as a check on expansionist desires on the part of Serbia or Roumania; but that had no immediate significance. The conduct of the Constantinople government, both at home and abroad in the first six months of 1914, earned it no compliments from Vienna. In December 1913 Pallavicini had reported that it was only the lack of funds that prevented the Constantinople régime from starting trouble154); and in February .1914 the Ballhausplatz coupled the ‘Unberechenbarkeit der gegenwärtigen türkischen Militärdiktatur’ with Serbian irredentism as the two chief sources of the prevailing uncertainty155). Pallavicini himself lectured the Turks on the great dangers involved in fos15°) PA I 495: Berchtold to Pallavicini, No. 4319, 11 September 1913. lsl) PA I 496: Berchtold to Szögyény, No. 1283, 25 March 1914.

151 a) PA I 495: Musulin memorandum on ‘Stand der Adaliafrage’, 1 December 1913.

152) PA I 496: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 48 E, 6 July 1914.

ls3) PA I 496: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 82 H, 29 December 1913.

154) PA XII 207: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 79 A, 17 December 1913.

155) Nachlaß Mens dorff 9: Forgách to Mensdorff, 5 February 1914.