Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34. (1981)
BRIDGE, Francis Roy: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century
264 Francis Roy Bridge terűig a national-islamic movement which, if it at that time concentrated its wrath on Greeks and Armenians, might soon develop into a general xenophobia that could seriously damage European trade; on their foolish persecution of the Greeks in Thrace, among the most productive elements in the empire; and on their clumsy handling of the Arabs, which could easily provoke a ‘recht unheilsame’ situation for the government156). On an international level too, the strained relations between Turkey and Italy; Talaat’s visit to the tsar at Livadia; the hearty approval expressed by the Turkish press over the tsar’s visit to Roumania in June; and Turkish flirtations with the idea (which, to Berchtold’s dismay, not only Russia but Germany was anxious to promote) of a rapprochement with Greece that would leave Austria- Hungary’s Bulgarian protégés weak and encircled: all this was noted in Vienna with disapproval and dismay156“). It was hardly surprising, therefore, that as the July crisis moved towards its climax, the Austrians did not set much store by the grand vizir’s expressions of sympathy, or by his advice that the Triple Alliance should take a strong line with Belgrade in order to impress Turkish opinion157). Pallavicini emphasized rather the strong French and Russian counter-currents at Constantinople, and the indecision and unpreparedness of the government158). He agreed with his German colleague that there could be no question of the Central Powers’ seeking a Turkish alliance for the present: Turkey would not be ‘bündnisfähig’ for years yet159). The two ambassadors remained sceptical even after Wilhelm II suddenly began to demand an alliance on 25 July: Turkey would not be able even to resist Russia in Armenia, let alone render active assistance in the Balkans; the best that could be hoped for was to prevent Turkey’s actually joining the entente camp or coming to blows with Bulgaria160). True, when the Turks themselves suddenly proposed an alliance to Germany on 27 July Berchtold could hardly condemn the idea. But he had great reservations, especially about an alliance involving Austria-Hungary. It was only when the Germans insisted that he agreed to participate, and even then only as an acceding party to the Turco-German treaty of 2 August161). Even at this stage the Austrians were showing that same wariness and lack of enthusiasm that had been such a marked characteristic of their attitude towards the Ottoman empire in the last years of peace. 156) PA XII 207: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 20M, 23 March; No. 28 N, 22 April; No. 32 G, 4 May 1914. 156a) Albertini The Origins of the War 1 534ff. 157) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Berchtold, telegram 325, 13 July; telegram 338, 20 July; telegram 342, 22 July; telegram 345, 24 July 1914. 15S) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Berchtold, telegram 324, 12 July; No. 51 PolA, 20 July 1914. 159) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Berchtold, telegram 333, 16 July 1914. 16°) pa I 522: Pallavicini to Berchtold, private lester, 25 July 1914; telegram 334, 18 July; No. 51 Pol, 20 July; No. 51 PolC, 20 July; telegram 346, 25 July 1914. 161) PA I 522: Berchtold to Pallavicini, private letter, 1 August 1914.
