Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34. (1981)
BRIDGE, Francis Roy: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century
262 Francis Roy Bridge other powers with, at best, ‘Kolonien . . welche sozusagen in der Luft wären und in Europa selbst verteidigt werden müßten’. As for Austria-Hungary, who had not yet even established a foothold in the area, she would probably get nothing at all. He concentrated for the time being, therefore, on using his position as doyen and chairman of the ambassadors’ meetings to shift the discussion from the Mandelstam project to a relatively innocuous Turkish scheme. Berchtold broadly agreed with Pallavicini; but it is noteworthy that it was concern for Austria-Hungary’s prestige, rather than for the future of Asia Minor, that characterized his instructions to the ambassador. From the start he was emphatic both in Constantinople and, significantly, in Berlin, that Austria-Hungary should have an absolutely equal role along with the other five powers in operating any scheme146). On 1 July he sent the grotesque instruction to Pallavicini to point out, if Russia again mentioned her special position as a neighbour of Armenia, ‘daß auch wir im Hinblick auf unser armenisches Bevölkerungselement in den östlichen Teilen des Reiches sowie auf unsere mohammedanischen Kreise ein nicht weniger lebhaftes Interesse an dieser Frage haben’147). But in the end the Austrians got no share in the scheme. In September, Russia and Germany combined forces over a scheme which the Austrians thought dangerously reminiscent of the Mandelstam project, but which, as they were isolated, they had willy-nilly to endorse — albeit with the proviso that Austro-Hungarian personnel should also be involved1473). In March 1914, however, the Turks, by threatening to refer the whole question back to the forum of the six Powers, forced Russia and Germany to eliminate any traces of effective foreign control, and to employ Europeans not from the Great Powers, but only from the middle states. The Austrians seemed content with this: they had got nothing, but neither had the other Great Powers; and Pallavicini observed blandly that, in its mutilated form, ‘dem Reformwerke das Schicksal beschieden [ist], das alle Reformbestrebungen in der Türkei hatten’148). Even more futile were Austrian attempts in 1913-14 to lay the foundations for a colony incorporating most of the southern coast of Asia Minor149). The venture was an excellent example of that concern to avoid losing prestige that was to become an obsession of Vienna in these months. It was not a response to commercial pressure at all: there was at first absolutely no demand to found colonies from commercial circles at home; and such little interest as eventually developed had to be stirred up artificially by the government. 146) PA XII 463: Berchtold to Szögyény, telegram 386, 5 June 1913. 147) PA XII 463: Berchtold to Pallavicini, telegram 308, 1 July 1913. 147a) pa XII 463: Pallavicini to Berchtold, telegram 506, 21 September 1913 and Berchtold to Flotow, No. 4600, 27 September 1913. 14S) PA XII 463: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 15 PolH, 2 March 1914. 149) F[rancis] R[oy] Bridge ‘Tarde venientibus ossa’: Austro-Hungarian colonial aspirations in Asia Minor 1913-14 in Middle Eastern Studies 6 (1970) 319-330.
