Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 21. (1968)
MIYAKE, Masaki: Die Achse Berlin – Rom – Tokio im Spiegel der japanischen Quellen
442 Masaki Miyake Minister. At the plenary session all the members of the Cabinet, with the exception of Commerce Minister Kobayashi and Home Minister Yasui, were in attendece. HOSHINO and MUTO were also present in the capacity of „Explainers“, with several others, but they were not responsible for the proceedings. As for the responsible ministers in attendence I am the sole member among the defendants. I might say that on such an occasion the proceedings of the Privy Council are not taken down stenographically but are simply summaries of the explanations or remarks compiled by secretaries in attendance. Hence there is no guarantee that the gist of the explanatory remarks coincide completely with the summaries. The same situation prevailed at this particular meeting. At the meeting I, as War Minister, made the explanatory remarks that in the event of a war between Japan and America the Army would divert a part of its strength. This remark was made in response to a question based upon the premise of the „worse possible contingency“, and was grounded on the strategic plans which had been drawn up against America by the Supreme Command as a portion of its annual strategic plans. There plans were drawn up by the Supreme Command on its own responsibility and in pursuance with its delegated functions, and had no bearing whatsoever on the question of whether or not any decision had been made on the part of the Government as to war with America. The Supreme Command drew up strategic operational plans against potential enemies in peace time the same as the army branch so designated in every nation did. It is a part of the regular responsibility of such organizations. I recall another point in connection with that meeting, and that was a question propounded by a Councillor pertaining to harmonious relations with the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister MATSUOKA replied to that query by referring to Article 5 of the proposed treaty and to notes to be exchanged, and explained that Germany was to offer its good offices in bringing about harmonious relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. The treaty was signed on the 27th, after confirmation by the Privy Council, and the accompanying Imperial Rescript was issued on the same day. (Ex. 43 and 554). 12. From my knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the signing of the Tripartite Alliance, it is my sincere belief that the purpose of the treaty was to improve the international position of Japan and thereby operate as a factor in the solution of the China Incident, as well as in preventing the spread of the European War to East Asia. From the very outset of the negotiations on the Alliance to the final stages of its ratification there was no thought whatsoever of dividing the world among the signatory powers, nor of world conquest. It was considered solely as a means of defending this country against the onslaughts of the „Have“ nations, and to find a way to survive under the prevailing international situation. The „New Order in Greater East Asia“ itself was based upon the foundations of mutual prosperity, independence, and the sovereignty of all nations concerned. Consequently each and every one of the treaties signed subsequently by Japan with the various states of Greater East Asia were predicated upon that recognition of the inviolability of each other’s territorial integrity and absolute sovereignty. The term „position of leadership“ used in the Alliance refers to the role of what might be termed a „trail blazer“ or „guide“ i. e. the nation taking the initiative, and there is no connotation of domination or of subjugation. That was the understanding of the term held by Prime Minister KONOYE and all the members of the Cabinet.
