Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 21. (1968)

MIYAKE, Masaki: Die Achse Berlin – Rom – Tokio im Spiegel der japanischen Quellen

Die Achse Berlin-Rom-Tokio im Spiegel der japanischen Quellen 441

make ample reservations on Japan’s freedom of action concerning any obligation to lend assistance in the remote possibility of American entry 77).

The fourth point considered was whether there was any confidence in improving relations with the Soviet Union. Mr. MATSUOKA stated that Germany desired an understanding between Japan and the Soviet, and was willing to offer her assistance in the matter78). All present accepted Mr. MATSUOKA’s views.

Following this, the Imperial Conference was held at about 3 P. M. of the same day, and approval was given to the decisions of the Liaison Conference 79). During the proceedings President Hara of the Privy Council proposed a question to the following effect, „America is withholding her pressure against Japan appreciably in order to prevent our entry on the side of Germany and Italy. In case a treaty is signed, and our attitude is clarified, will that not result in an intensification of American pressure against Japan, and result in obstructing the solution of the China Incident?“ Foreign Minister MATSUOKA’s reply to this question was, „American sentiment today against Japan is extremely bad and this condition cannot be remedied by a mere policy of appeasement. Under the present circumstances a firm stand on our part is the only way war can be prevented.“ Mr. MATSUOKA proceeded to confer with Herr Stahmer, and drafted the Tripartite Pact, which in turn was submitted to the Cabinet and subsequently to the Privy Council.

11. The meeting of the Privy Council to consider this Treaty commenced with the session of the Investigation Committee, at 10 A. M. on 26 September 1940 followed by the plenary session at 9:40 P. M. of the same day in the presence of the Emperor. (Ex. Nos. 552 and 553) 80). The Cabinet Members present at the Investigation Committee session were the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the War Minister, the Navy Minister and the Finance

77) Über die Bestrebung Matsuokas in dieser Hinsicht, siehe Meskill, a. a. O., S. 185 ff.

78) Ein japanisches Memorandum, das dem Tokioter Militärgerichtshof als Exhibit Nr. 549 vorgelegt wurde, befindet sich in dem Sonderband für Quellen- editation von Tsunoda u. a. (Tsunoda u. a., a. a. O., S. 334—336) und in: Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918—1945, Serie D, Band 11, Teil 1, in englischer Fassung angegeben (ebenda, S. 49—50). Darunter als Artikel 10: „Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no insurmountable obstacle on the path may be settled without much difficulty. German-Soviet relations are good contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagement.“ In dieser Aussage Stahmers gegenüber Matsuoka sind die Argumente Stahmers, die Matsuoka tief beeindruckten, kristallisiert.

79) Die Nachschrift der kaiserlichen Konferenz vom 19. 9. 1940 abgefaßt von dem Vize-Generalstabschef Generalleutnant Shigeru Sawada ist in dem Sonderband für Quellenedition von Tsunoda u. a. im Original enthalten (Tsunoda u. a., a. a. O., S. 337—342) und in dem Band von Ike in englischer Übersetzung.

80) Über die Debatte im Untersuchungsausschuß des Geheimen Staatsrates und in der Plenarsitzung des Geheimen Staatsrates siehe: Sommer, a. a. O., S. 423 ff.