Hermann Róbert: Kecskemétiek a szabadságharcban IV. Gáspár András honvédtábornok (Kecskemét, 2005)

Leiningen, Poeltenberg, Dessewffy as well as Kmety György who often criticised the decisions of Gáspár and Görgei, sometimes committed errors that were very similar to those of Gáspár's. And neither did they listen to their officers' recommendations, which later did turn out to seem a better solution. We must, however, add hastily, that by analysing the events after they occurred it is always easier to point out the right or better solution, but when on the scene the commander in charge is influenced by countless effects, when he has to evaluate the essential information from the unimportant, when to decide between the hazardous and safe solutions, even the generals of the Imperial Royal army - who received a military training of higher standards and had more experience at their hands than the Hungarian Generals - made mistakes. Their advantage in military conduct in the spring of 1849 as opposed to the often-criticised Hungarian generals was that they knew when to order the total surrender of their troops. Our volume is to introduce András Gáspár's career based upon the specialist literature, the published and so far unpublished sources of the Hungarian and Viennese archives. At the end of the volume we have included the Hungarian translation of Gáspár's reports and orders from 1848-49. 181