Papers and Documents relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Volume 2, 1921 (Budapest, 1946)

Documents

42 1921 Mr. Tusar, the former Prime Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, was also present. In the course of our conversation Mr. Tusar complained that markets for Czech industry had greatly contracted. I replied that improved relations with Hungary would open for Czech industry a considerable area of its former markets, but Czechoslovakia would have to make territorial concessions in order to improve relations. Hungary could not feel very friendly, I continued, toward a State whose frontiers are less than 40 kilometres from our capital and in which almost one million Hungarians live on territory detached from Hungary. I suggested that it would be in the interest of Czecho-Slovakia to get rid of this Hungarian minority, which she could never hope to assimilate, and which would only cause unrest and engender further dissatisfaction among other minorities in Czecho-Slovakia. To my great surprise, Mr. Tusar expressed agreement with my views but at once raised the dynastic question. If Hungary was determined, he said, to restore the Habsburgs and, particularly, King Charles, Czecho-Slovakia had no choice but to march into Hungary, because the Habsburgs would seek to re-establish the old Austro- Hungarian Monarchy and that would mean the destruction of Czecho-Slovakia. I pointed out the resolution of our Parliament that the King of Hungary could not be the sovereign of other countries. After some hesitation, Mr. Tusar frankly admitted that the Czechs and the Yugoslavs feared the Habsburgs, and particularly King Charles, because there were many adherents of His Majesty in Slovakia and in Croatia and a restoratior might cause great trouble in these two countries. He said that this was also the main reason for the formation of the Little Entente. However, if Hungary chose as king someone who was not a Habsburg, or even more, if she adopted a republican form of government, the Czechs would be willing to make substantial sacrifices. Of course Hungary would have to put an end to propaganda in Slovakia. I suggested that if our territorial claims were reasonably satisfied, the Government, which itself had not engaged in propaganda, would find a way to put an end to private propaganda. Moreover, Hungary could secure substantial economic and commercial advantages for Czecho-Slovakia. But any attempt to influence the decision as to our form of government would preclude the possibility of an agreement between the two countries. Such