Hungarian Church Press, 1968 (20. évfolyam, 2. szám)

1968-06-01 / 2. szám

HOP Vol XX Special Number

1968 No 2- 152 ~

(07933)

nuclear cjeuntries joining the treaty* It must he noted at tills point that the treaty does not want to limit in any form the peaceful, use of atomic energy, and the control would only prevent the military use of the produced fissionable material* As far as the difference is concerned between the nuclear and non-nuclear states in the matter* of inspection, there can be no doubt that what is agreed upon in the draft treaty can he controlled precisely in the relation of the treaty partners to those states whack*. at the time o£“ the signature, do not belong to the atom clubi (it is known that one of the main obstacles between the atomic powers in disarmament n< gotiations is the question of control and inspection«) Xet the solution of this problem is very urgent and. important, but it is the precondition of asking steps toward vertical disarmament rather than that of preventing the spread of nuclear Y/eapons©

But- without doubtj the non-proliferation agreement will give even more emphasis and. moral urgency to the demand for the diasarmoment of the atomic powers«

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Than another issue' conoernsthe safety of/nuclear powers* It was this need that was met by the March agreement and the declaration of the three atomic great powers« We must also note that the arming of the non-nuclear states be cf a very questionable value as far as their safety is concerned-, and the newly acquired nuclear armament, in certain cases, would even make them the targets of nuclear attack* The treaty would have the advantage trhat many countries would, be relieved of the financial, burden of armaments - if their potential opponent would join the caiip cf those in 1he possession of nuclear striking forces«

2) Since the Moscow Test Bern Treaty of 1963* the problem of underground tests has always been one of the vital topics of discussions© As it is known, the XVIIIth session of the UNO Assembly, in its resolution of the 27th of November, 1963, welcomed the Tost Ban Treaty aid appealed to all the states of the world to join the treaty, asking the nuclear powers tnat they, in line of what is sand in the introduction to the treaty, try to bring about an agreement concerning the underground tests as well? so that the prohibition of A and H bomb tests be thereby complete* This point, However, owing to the partners’ disagreement on control and inspection, eld not get into the Test Ban Treaty« It would be desirable to extend the scope of the treaty so as to cover the underground tests as weil for, without this, the atmosphere of the earth cannot- be completely protected against radioactive pollution«121) It is obvious that this new step might slow down the armament race: Those mainly concerned by this completion of the test ban treaty are the atomic powers' themselves.

The significance of it is clearly borne out if we consider that, on the other hand, it would be the non-nuclear powers that would take obligations on themselves by joining the non-proliferation treaty* This new partial agreement to include the ban on the underground tests is all the mere desirable as already the eight—power conference of experts in 1953 in Geneva - even at that „ stage of technological skill - made the statermrrt that underground explosions can he detected, and,since chat time, many eastern and western experts have gone on record’’with their opinion that the easier method cf control is possible, and it is detection by sensitive instruments, without on-the-spot inspection©