Hungarian Church Press, 1968 (20. évfolyam, 2. szám)

1968-06-01 / 2. szám

HOP Vol XX Special Number - 151 - (07932)

1968 No 2

the stride of international events-'.vili be'limited? Nevertheless, it means a most timely, useful aid. necessary step forward« The signing of the agreement will lessen the danger of a nuclear holocaust and prevent steps which might lead to incalculably serious consequences. As it is known, many countries have already readied that stage of technological development in which they might soon be able to create their own nuclear armament» 120 The threat of a oertain kind of nuclear proliferation is contained in the ideas concerning a MLF within the NATO., At the same time, it is clear that the emergence of a new atomic power might start a quick chain reaction, mainly beccaise sane of the potential atomic pavers arc in areas which are today the neuralgic , spots of international life. The same fact increases the threat that the ppssibly emerging new atomic paver might even use its new atomic weapons in socalled local conflicts.

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But the treaty would have a positive influence - this has already been demonstrated in the case of formerly concluded partial agreements - on the international atmosphere ard would not hinder but rather further the cause of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. Yet the wider the cirde of the atomic powers will be the harder it will be to achieve agreements on nuclear disarmament.» It is known, that in the course of the Geneva negotiations on non-proliferation many problems had to faced. The very duration of the conference and its events suggest tliese problems. The decisive stage was certainly reached in February, 1967, when at the reconvened session, it become apparent that the positions of the two main atomic powers, those of the Soviet Union and the U.S.A« had significantly converged. The next main tun>ing point was reached in August, 1967, when the Soviet Union and the United *■ States, although acting separately, submitted a draft treaty of an almost verbatim identity, leaving* open the question of control. Even this deficiency was made 15) by the January, 1968, agreement. And, at last, in early March of the same year, the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and Great Britain submitted their draft and declaration on guaranteeing the safety of the nonnuclear states joining the treaty, the safeguards to operate through the Security Ccfcruncil in the case of nuclear aggression or ihreat, chiefly with the intervention of the nuclear powers holding membership in the Security Council* (The declaration of the three great pavers said that, pending the adoption of the treaty, they are willing to take on themselves this obligation).

One of the snags in the course of the negotiations was the question of control. As it’ is known, the two greatest atomic pavers could not / for a long time, agree on the organ of this control (The U.S.A. - for, at least, some time - favoured the idea of taking the services of the EURATOM-ipr this purpose, this, however, would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and other countries as the EURATOM is directly connected with the NATO). The January, 1968, agreement specifies the Internr.tional Atomic Energy Agency of the UNO with its seat in Vienna as the organ of control, the participating states making separate agreements with this-agency concerning the method of control.

— The second neuralgic spot was the question as to the control cf the nonr-