1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
r larger by orders of magnitude. And a Soviet Dnion coping vith a alovdovn of its economic grovth, vitb tbe cost of overarming itself, and vith tbe West'a technological challenge, is nőt in a position to rescue its aatellites vith loans and grants.- As its economic hegemony veakens, tbe Soviet Dnion finds it increasingly difficult to offset the dravback of lacking cultural or social hegemony over most of tbe region. The Soviet Dnion is nőt a model, and nőt a source of intellectual stimulation. It is unable to prevent the spreading of influences arriving from outside its orbit.- At the time vhen the Soviet bloc emerged, the Soviet Dnion vas a régiónál pover. Since then it has become a vorld pover, in strategic competition vith the Dnited States and ezpanding its influence over Africa, Asia and Latin America. The consequences of the Soviet Dnion'a ezpansion are conflicting, and in part favorable from the vievpoint of our region. Dnable to vin the arms race, the Soviet Dnion is forced to negotiate. It is being pressed tovard a compromise alsó by the fact that it can hope to narrov its technological gap only through closer economic and scientific relations. It cannot strengthen its long-term positions by relying on brute force, and is thus compelled to bargain. Fór these very reasons, hovever, the Soviet Dnion is nov unable to do vhat it once could vithin the bloc it established in 1944-1945. It cannot prevent the satellites from turning likevise tovard the West. Threats of force, and open military intervention are posing an ever-greater risk. All these trends are narroving the rangé of instrument6 in the armory of Soviet control over our region. If the Soviet leadership insists that nothing must cbange, as it insisted during the lest 15 years under Brezhnev, then the region vili become unmanagable. Bút if the Soviet leadership recognizes the need fór changes in mutual relations, as it has recognized since Gorbachev came to pover, then there vili be vider room fór an orderly transformát ion. The present policies of the CFSD offer several clues to those vho vant changes in the internál conditions of their countries, and in the structure of the Soviet bloc:- The CPSD has announced that the Soviet economy and society are hoth in need of radical reforms. Thus the hardliners in East Europe are no longer able to U6e Soviet opposition to reform as an argument.- The CPSD has pointed out that the Soviet system of institutions is nőt a mandatory model, and ha6 declared its intention to borrov in restructuring from the experience of the East European reforms.- The CPSD has recognized that changes are necessary in the mutual relations of the countries in the region. ÍC 66 «#
