1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2

- Finally, tbe CFSU has demonstrated alsó vitb deeds, particularly in the case of Poland, a villingneas to accept as normál ouch more tban before.

Since the establisbment of the Soviet bloc, tbe external conditions fór tbe aatellitea' domestic development have never before been ao favorable as nov.

It would be unforgivable to mise tbis opportunity.

It is alsó vorth pondering publicly vhat changes are necessary and possible in the mutual relations of the countries vithin the Soviet bloc. It vould be illusory to hope fór the abrogation of the Yalta Agreement. Bút if ve accept Yalta as given, it vould be a reasonable political initiative to debate tbe vays in vhicb tbe one-sided dependence could be balanced.

Tbere are tvo counterarguments that are usually raised in Hungary against tbis line of reasoning:

.- First, it is alleged that only Gorbachev's rbetoric is radical. Vhat he actually vants ve have already achieved. And vhat he vili be able to push through, against the inertia of his apparatuses, vili be much less. This is probably true to a large extent. Bút it does nőt follov that Hungary'8 political and economic aystems are nőt in need of radical transformát ion.

And it does nőt follov that the prospects fór the acceptance of vhat are regarded as radical changes in Hungary are nőt substantially better than they vere in Brezhnev's time.- The other counterargument is that Gorbachev could be ouated or forced to back dovn. That is true. Bút it does nőt follov that ve should nőt avail ourselves of the better opportunities, specifically nov vben Gorbachev is still fighting to assert his policies.

The more ve are 8ble to get the Soviet leadership to accept today, the more ve vould be able to defend later, during a possible backlash. And vhen ve are veighing the force of the possible backlash, ve have to take intő account the long-term trends of the changes that are veakening Soviet control over the region.

Let us note that those vho are arguing against our taking advantage of the opportunities fear the success of the attempt, rather than its failure.

2. The Issue of the Hungárián Minorities

It is fir6t of all our morál obligation to face the critical situation of the Hungárián minorities beyond our borders. The nation living on the territory of the Hungárián State is responsible fór those of its parte that have been forced intő minority status beyond our borders. Ve must assume deliberately the burdens stemming from this responsibility, having clarified in public debate vhat ve regard as an acceptable solution of the minority issue and vhat ve can do to achieve such a solution.

Bút there are alsó political argument6 in favor of carefully considering the minority issue publicly:

lel

s---------------------------------------------------------------------------------