1987. Különkiadvány, 1987.10.01 / HU_BFL_XIV_47_2
<* PART III BROADER INTERRELATIONS Any program fór resolving the crisis must render an account of how the proposed changes will fit intő the country's external situation, and bow.they will be affected by the still painful traumas of Hungary's modern history. In the following we will raise the most pressing questionss 1. How should we perceive Hungary's relationship with the Soviet Union, and what changes can we strive fór in the Soviet bloc's internál order? 2. What should be Hungary's policy on the issue of the Hungárián minorities beyond our borders? 3. Is it possible to heal the national rift caused by the 1956 revolution's suppression? 1. Hungary in the Soviet Bloc We noted in the first part of this text that the Soviet leadership has become more tolerant since 1956, and its Instruments of direct intervention have weakened. One cannot count on the Soviet bloc's disintegration within the foreseeable future. And there is no reál chance of one or another of the satellites breaking away, either. Bút there is an opportunity fór the satellite countries to increase their relative independence of the Soviet Union. Irreversible long-term changes are taking piacé in our region:- The Soviet Union has run out of natural resources that can be extracted at low cost. It is nőt possible to expand further the CEMA concept of "Soviet materials fór East European machinery." CEMA as a system of cooperation is in a crisis; and severally the East European planned economies, founded on unlJLmited Soviet deliveries at low cost, are likewise plunged intő crises.- As a hierarchic system of relations based on political agreements, CEMA itself has become an obstacle to the expansion of mutual trade. The member nations' stagnating outputs and mounting Western debts are further causes of the decline in mutual trade.- After 1956, and again after 1968, the Soviet Union still had sufficient matériái resources to aid the restorational regimes coping with political crises. The amounts which would be needed fór the same purpose today are larger by orders of magnitude. And a Soviet Union coping with a slowdown of ■ j ér jl I
