Fáklyaláng, 1965. október (6. évfolyam, 1-10. szám)

1965-10-23 / 10. szám

10

FÁKLYALÁNG

Facts About The Hungarian Revolution of 1956

Excerpts From The Report of The Special Committee of U.N. On The Problem of Hungary

CONCLUSIONS

784. The terms of reference of the Special Committee covered a broad field, namely to report to the General Assembly of the United Nations after full and objective investigation, its findings on all aspects of the question of Soviet intervention in Hungary by armed force and by other means and the effects of such intervention on the political development of Hungary. The Committee's investigation, as has been explained, involved the study of copious documentation from various sources and in several languages, as well as the questioning ot more than a hundred witnesses, whose testimony fills two thousand pages in the verbatim record. The Committee regrets that the attitude of the Hungarian Government has prevented it from basing its investigation on direct observation in Hungary, as required by the General Assembly resolution.

785. The Committee’s findings relate to many aspects of the events in Hungary and are concerned with numerous points of detail that have a bearing on the origin and nature of those events. The report itself embodies the conclusions of the Commitee, and these conclusions cannot be readily dissociated from the evidence which is there assembled. A summary of the Committee's findings on individual aspects of the situation in Hungary has been appended to certain of the chapters. It would, however, seem appropriate at this stage to summarize a number of conclusions drawn by the Committee from its study of the evidence as a whole. To the best of the Committee’s belief, these conclusions represent the essential facts about the Hungarian uprising which are necessary to an understanding of its nature and outcome. They are as follows:

(i) What took place in Hungary in October and November 1956 was a spontaneous national uprising, due to long-standing grievances which had caused resentment among the people. One of these grievances was the inferior status of Hungary with regard to the USSR; the system of government was in part maintained by the weapon of terror, wielded by the AVH or political police, whose influence was exercised at least until the end of 1955, through a complex network of agents and informers permeating the whole of Hungarian society. In other respects also, Soviet pressure was resented. From the stifling of free speech to the adoption of a Soviet-style uniform for the Hungarian army, an alien influence existed in all walks of life. Hungarians felt no personal animosity towards the individual Soviet soldiers on Hungarian soil, but these armed forces were symbols of something which annoyed a proud people and fed the desire to be free;

(ii) The thesis that the uprising was fomented by reactionary circles in Hungary and that it drew its strength from such circles and from Western “Imperialists” failed to survive the Committee’s examination. From start to finish, the uprising was

led by students, workers, soldiers and intellectuals, many of whom were Communists or former Communists. The majority of political demands put forward during the revolution included a stipulation that democratic socialism should be the basis of the Hungarian political structure and that such social achievements as the land reform should be safeguarded. At no time was any proposal made for the return to power, or to the Government, of any figure associated with pre-war days. “Fascists” and “saboteurs”, heavily armed, could not have succeeded in landing on Hungarian airfields which were under Soviet supervision, or in crossing the Austrian frontier, where a closed zone was shown by the Austrian authorities to the military attachés of France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the USSR;

(iii) The uprising was not planned in advance. It was the universal testimony of witnesses examined by the Committee that events took participants by surprise. No single explanation can determine exactly why the outbreak occurred just when it did. Communist spokesmen, including Mr. Kádár and the members of his present Government, have recognized the bitter grievances of the Hungarian people before 23 October. They have spoken of a ‘“broad, popular movement” caused by the “bitterness and indignation” of the masses. Two factors would seem to have brought this resentment to a head. The first of these was the news received on 19 October of a successful move by Poland for greater independence from the USSR. This news was largely instrumental in bringing the Hungarian students together in the meetings of 22 October. The second factor was the acute disappointment felt by the people when Ernő Gerő, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers’ (Communist) Party, in his speech on the evening of 23 October failed to meet any of the popular demands and adopted what was considered a truculent tone towards his hearers;

(iv) Although no evidence exists of advance planning, and although the whole course of the uprising bears the hallmark of continuous improvisation. it would appear that the Soviet authorities had taken steps as early as 20 October to make armed intervention in Hungary possible. Evidence exists of troop movements, or projected troop movements, from that date on. It would appear that plans for action had therefore been laid some time before the students met to discuss their demands. The Committee is not in a position to say whether the Soviet authorities anticipated that the grievances of the Hungarian people, stimulated by events in Poland, could no longer be contained. Signs of opposition were evident before the 23rd; the Hungarian Government had reason to foresee that trouble was brewing. While the evidence shows that Soviet troops from outside Hungary were used even in the first intervention, no clause of the Warsaw