Fáklyaláng, 1965. október (6. évfolyam, 1-10. szám)

1965-10-23 / 10. szám

FÁKLYALÁNG

11

Treaty provides for intervention by armed forces of the Soviet Union to dictate political developments within any signatory’s frontiers;

(v) The demonstrations on 23 October were at first entirely peaceable. None of the demonstrators appear to have carried arms, and no evidence has been discovered that any of those who voiced the political demands or joined the demonstrators had any intention to resort to force. While disappointment at Mr. Gerő’s speech may have angered the crowds, it would hardly of itself have sufficed to turn the demonstration into an armed uprising. That this happened was due to the action of the AVH in opening fire on the people outside the radio building. Within a few hours, Soviet tanks were in action against the Hungarians. This appearance of Russian soldiers in their midst not as friendly allies, but as enemies in combat, had the effect of still further uniting the people;

(vi) Obscurity surrounds the invitation alleged to have been issued by the Hungarian Government to the Soviet authorities to assist in quelling the uprising by force. Mr. Nagy has denied, with every' appearance of truth, that he issued this invitation or was even aware of it. Since Soviet tanks appeared on the streets of Budapest at about 2 a.m. on 24 October, it would have been impossible for him to have addressed any official message to the Soviet authorities, since he held no government post at the time when the tanks must have received thenorders. An invitatiton may have been made privately by Mr. Gerő, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or Mr. Hegedűs, the Prime Minister. The Committee, however, has had no opportunity of seeing a text of such an invitation, or of considering the exact circumstances in which it may have been issued. Until further information comes to light, it would be wise to suspend judgement as to whether such an invitation was issued at all.

Similar considerations apply to the invitation which is alleged to have been addressed to the Soviet authorities before the second intervention on 4 November. Mr. Kádár had remained a member of Mr. Nagy’s Government when the latter was reconstituted on 3 November and the Committee is unaware of his having given any recorded indication of his disapproval of Mr. Nagy’s policies. Mr. Kádár’s movements at this time are not fully known, and he cannot be considered to have substantiated his own claim to have called, in the name of the Government, for Soviet help. In any event, there is abundant evidence that Soviet preparations for a further intervention, including the movement of troops and armour from abroad, had been under way since the last days of October. Mr. Kádár and his Ministers were absent from Budapest during the first few days after he formed his Government, and administrative instructions to the people of Hungary were issued by the commander of the Soviet troops;

(vii) When Mr. Nagy became Prime Minister, he was not at first able to exercise the full powers of that office. Only when the grip of the AVH was loosened by the victory of the insurgents was he able to take an independent stand. By this time, the real power in Hungary lay with the Revolutionary and Workers’ Councils, which had sprung up spontaneously in different parts of the country and had replaced the collapsing structure of the Communist Party. Mr. Nagy, though himself a Communist of long standing who had lived for many years in the USSR, invited non-Communists into his new Government, and listened to the demands of various Revolutionary and Workers’ Councils. It would appear that Mr. Nagy himself, like the country at large, was somewhat taken aback by the pace of developments. However, seeing that his countrymen were united in their desire for other forms of government and the departure of Soviet troops, he threw in his lot with the insurgents. By this action, he obliterated the impression which he had created while still under the domination of the AVH, and he became a symbolic figure in the uprising, although he had not instigated it, and was never its actual leader;

(viii) The few days of freedom enjoyed by the Hungarian people provided abundant evidence of the popular nature of the uprising. A free Press and radio came to life all over Hungary, and the disbanding of the AVH was the signal for general rejoicing, which revealed the degree of unity achieved by the people, once the burden of fear had been lifted from them;

(ix) There were a number of lynchings and beatings by the crowds. These were, in almost all cases, confined to members of the AVH or those who were believed to have co-operated witht them;

(x) Steps were taken by the Workers’ Councils during this period to give the workers real control of nationalized industrial undertakings and to abolish unpopular instiutions, such as the production norms. These were widely resented as being unfair to workers and also a reflection of popularly suspected secret trade agreements with the USSR, which were said to make heavy demands on the Hungarian economy for the benefit of the Soviet Union. During the days of freedom, while negotiations continued with the Soviet authorities for the withdrawal of Russian troops, attempts were made to clear up the streets of Budapest and life was beginning to return to normal. The insurgents had agreed to amagamate, while maintaining their identity, in a National Guard, which would have been responsible, with the Army and Police, for maintaining order;

(xi) In contrast to the demands for the reestablishment of political rights put forward during the uprising, is the fact that basic human rights of the Hungarian people were violated by the Hungarian Governments prior to 23 October, especially up to the autumn of 1955, and that such violations have been resumed since 4 November. The Committee is convinced that the numerous accounts of inhuman treatment and torture by the AVH are to be accepted as true. On the evidence, it is also convinced that numbers of Hungarians, including some women, were deported to the Soviet Union and that some may not have been returned to their homes. These deportations were designed to break the back of the revolution. Action taken by the Hungarian people in their spontaneous uprising succeeded in ridding them for a few days of the apparatus of police terror. This democratic achieve-