Baltimore-i Értesítő, 1976 (12. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1976-03-15 / 3. szám
New CÍA Director George H. Bush, an able mar. of outstanding ability in a difficult role, is being briefed on Soviet Politburo member Yurt V. Andropov, chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee and thus head of the dreaded KGB Andropov, a mercurial chameleon In the realm of political Intrigue, has eyes as aharp as screws, a amal! pursed mouth abofe a pointed chin, talks as if he were ipeaking into t bucket and is as dangerous as spotted fever; a thoroughly reprehensible thug Officially, the KGB is a government agency at the ministry level. Actually, because the Soviet government is secondary at every level ho the Communist party structure, the real authority in the KGB is in the Administraaive Organs section of the Communist party!* Central Committee Secretariat. This is headed by First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev. Andropov is merely Brezhnev’s lackey. The Brezhnev brand if on his forehead like a slave mark. And when Brezhnev says "Frog,” Andropov jumps. It is Brezhnev himself who has direct and absolute control of the infamous KGB. In Russia, fewer than 15 million Communist party members, that’s all, control the 252-million population. This is minority rule by only six per cent of the people. Moreover, this rule is enforced by minority within the ridiculously small minority. Actual power rests with a group of Central Committee members who are the tiny fraction that belong to the Politburo. The KGB spends much more annually than the United States and aerves not so much the Soviet state as the Communist party and its small band of masters. Mr. Bush’s briefing reveals that the KGB thinks of itself (probably the best single definition) as the "Sword and Shield of the Party.” For it Is tha «word by which party rulers enforce their will and the shield which protects them from opposition. The KGB has 15 directorates (departments). Mr. Bush'S briefing reveals that, behind the scenes, Brezhnev is now follow ing a policy of not letting Andropov know what the KGB is doing and of not letting oar KGB directorate know what another is doing. • Brezhnev, without consulting Andropov, put in as head of the First Directorate Lieut. Gen. Alexsandr M. Sakharovsky. Brezhnev owns the golden handcuffs around Sakharovsky's wrists; handcuffs forged by many threads over a long time. The First Directorate employs about 10,000 spies abroad. And Sakharovsky's American section is overwhelmingly the largest section. Mr. Bush's CIA briefers reminded him that former CIA chief Allen W. Dulles stated: "The Soviet had over 40 high level — high level — agents in various Washington departments during World War II. That many were uncovered; we don’t know how many remained undetected." No intelligence manager could conceivably believe there are fewer in place in Washington today — and probably at least four times that number. Lieut. Gen. Oieg M. Gibanov, another Brezhnev stooge, heads the Second Directorate. It polices internal security with about 250,000 secret police. Millions sleep with one eye open, waiting for the knock. And the Second Directorate works with the Seventh Directorate, commanded by Maj. Gen. V.l. Aladin, still another Brezhnev stooge. The Seventh shadows suspicious foreigners in Russia. Aladin has 3,000 such agents in Moscow alone. And Brezhnev has put him over Maj. Gen. Serafim N. Lyanlin of the Eighth to deal with foreign code-breaking and embassy communications surveillance. Mr. Bush’s briefing indicates that Brezhnev has tied in Lieut Gen. Pavel I. Zyryanov of the Ninth. Zyryanov commands 100,000 border guards. Surely the freedom to leave is any nation's first freedom. But in (he USSR a job applicant must produce a work book. Exit visa applicants are noted in ii as "dismissed unfavorably.” In effect, this blacklists them for employment. Then the KGB can arrest them if they do not find a job within 15 days. That means up to one year in prison. Mr. Bush's briefers are telling him that because the preservation of power depends so heavily on the KGB Brezhnev is giving the KGB resources, responsibilities and authority never before concentrated in any organization. One of the problems constantly encountered in discussions of the Soviet regime Is the standard conservative argument that ,the Communists want to replace capitalism with public ownership and eliminate private property. This is considered a bad thing. The difficulty is that this attributes to the Soviet elite a set of ideals, when in fact it is a crew of cynical gangsters. Gangsters who, by the way, live a life of luxury worthy of top American capitalists and whose children grow up in a private universe comparable to the old Groton-Harvard syndrome. True, Brezhnev doesn't own his "dacha," but does the president of American Widgets own that nice cottage ("conference center’’) in Barbados? Or does American Widgets own it, and the jet used to get there? In other worts, the argument between the Communists and the advocates of a free society does not hinge on the nature of property. To coin an original phrase, this is a red herring — as is the talk aboqt “godleas ■theism.” Stalin gave Op "godless atheism" during World War II, shot the old militants of the "league of the militant godless," and co-opted the Orthodox church. He decided religion had utility provided it knew its place. This has paid off; The metropolitan of Leningrad, a Communist stooge, has just been elected one of the presidents of the World Council of Churches. He has stated authoritatively there is no religious persecution in the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons why Soviet Communism is treated as an ideology rather than a racket is probably — ironically enough — the body of literature by ex-Com- munists, most of whom were intellectuals who simply didn’t recognize a brutal con game when they saw one. On ray shelves there must be 15 or 20 volumes in this genre ranging from the collection "The God That Failed,” Koestler's “Darkness At Noon” and Poretsky’s "Our Own People” to the more realistic “Case Of Comrade Tulayev” by Victor Serge. To one degree or another, they all treat Soviet totalitarianism as a set of principles, derived from Marx and Engels, that have been twisted and perverted by a Stalinist bureaucracy. This has led some Soviet dissidents to sponsor a "Back To Lenin!" movement. The historian Roy Medvedev has devoted two volumes to this thesis, but members of this school refuse to recognize that Lenin opened the casino. In the December issue cf "Midstream,” the historian and biographer Joel Carmichael emphasizes the fact (actually on the record since 1921) that the Kaiser’s secret service — in addition to providing the Bolshevik leader with a train from Switzerland to Russia — supplied the Communists with the equivalent of 800 million 1976 dollars to undermine the democratic provisional government that overrthrew czarism In February, 1917. How’s that for a ‘‘destabilization” operation? The Germans temporarily got their money's worth; The Bolshevik revolution took Russia out of the war. No, despite its patina of high theory, and the commitment of some genuine idealists, at ground zero the Soviet system has always been a sanguinary racket. The terror was introduced by Lenin (whose favorite N. Bukharin got off the jolly quip that he believed in the two-party system: "one in power and the other in jail”) and perfected by Stalin in the great purges. Bukharin turned up again in an underground joke: Three men met in an “isolator’’ discussing their charges. The first said, "I was accused of conspiring with Bukharin.” The second, “I was accused of conspiring against Bukharin." The third, "I’m Bukharin.” Solzhenitsyn has given us the general operational code of the elite: A guard asks a "zek” en route to Siberia what he got. “25 years — and for hothing!” "Nonsense,” says the guard. "For nothing you get ten.” What triggered this historical excursion . Is the news that Moscow has, since the great Helsinki jamboree, clamped down on * .emigration and in general taken a very hardline on “Basket 3,’’ the section dfaling with improved international communications. Of course they have: They got what they wanted from us, a legitimation of their post-World War II conquests, Now all bets are off. Wlien will Chairman Kissinger realize that the normal 19th Century rules of diplomacy do not apply to gangsters? Mr. Cliff Everett, az Ausztrál Állami Gabonaértékesítő Hivatal 74 éves tagja tavaly bevallotta, hogy 1956-ban, moszkvai hotelszobájában, az egyik reggel kettőkor félmeztelen szőke nőt küldtek be hozzá, aki azután érdeklődött, nincs-e valami óhaja? A hölgy később hozzádörgö- lödött és arról érdeklődött, hogy kényelmes-e az ágya? Cliff azonban okos ember volt. Gyorsan számbavette életkorát, megnézte az óráján hány óra van, s o kettőből arra a megállapításra jutott, hogy itt minden valószínűség szerint — az eladandó ausztrál gabonáról lesz szó . . , + -t- -r Képeslap érkezett Kopcnhágá- ból. “A napok repülnek, remekül érezzük magunkat. Itt már sok- mindenben el őrre vannak nálunk. Tegnap melltartót láttunk egy ANTIK BOLT kirakatában . .”
