Baltimore-i Értesítő, 1975 (11. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)

1975-03-01 / 3. szám

Christian Crusad# W*sk!y—Jan. 19, 1975

Mindszenty Tells His Story

Through his Memoirs (Macmillan, 341 pp., $10), a weH-documented volume, listing events in chronological order between 1944 and 1956, Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty relates the details of the Communist tactics in taking over a country and subjugating a people.

(The third chapter reads like a textbook and should be required reading for all.)

The cardinal, in a concise, factual style records the “liberation” of Hungary by Russian troops and the subsequent steps taken to force the will of a small minority (the Communist Party received only 17 per cent of the votes in 1945) on the opposing majority (the smallholders party had gained 57.7 per cent of the votes in the same election).

Without regard for his own life or welfare. Cardinal Mindszenty, refused to yield to intimidation, to compromise with this minority, considering that “our principal task was to hold out where we stood, to alarm Christendom ... I was convinced that we had been called to bear witness. Within the Church we had to maintain the hope that better times in the future would restore to us all that was being taken from us. Come what might, we must never act opportunistically, disregarding religious interests.” (p. 63)

And that is where the true stature of the man Mindszenty emerges. He was not obstinate, but a leader who knew that the future would not be secured by compromise. He gave an example of unshakeable faith and strong leadership as he looked to longterm results rattier man snort-term accommodations. That is why the Communist regime, which also aimed at long-term control, had io do away with him.

Here then we finally have Cardinal Joseph Mindszenty’s account of the torture and brainwashing that catapulted him into the international limelight at the time of his mock trial in 1949. Without hate or bitterness towards his persecutors, the cardinal touches on the daily beatings with a »truncheon, the unceasing interrogations, the efforts of the guards to prevent him from sleeping, his treatment with drugs, and it becomes easy to understand how even such a strong- willed personality can be brainwashed:

“Day and night my alleged ‘sins’ had been hammered into me, and now I myself began to think that somehow I might very well be guilty ... 1 was left with only one certainty, ihat there was no longer any way out of this situation. My shaken nervous system weakened the resistance of my mind, clouded my memory, undermined my self-confidence, unhinged my will” (p. 110)

Twenty-five years ago the Communists were using the methods recently publicized and strongly protested by Russian writers: “There was always the threat of transfer to insane asylums.” (p. 139)

Yet the impression remains that Cardinal Mindszenty has played down the agonies he underwent and that we have not been told all. He describes the infamous “trial” at which his so- called “defense” attorney, appointed

by the regime, did all he could to play into the hands of the prosecution.

Then the book's pace and mood change with the cardinal’s imprisonment. The section on solitary confinement is almost lyrical. We accompany the cardinal in “the greatest torment in prison”: the monotony of waiting, and we discover that anonymous, untold millions in iron Curtain countries have endured for decades, at the whim of the regime. How strangling that regime’s atheistic hold is, is perhaps best illustrated by the whispered comment on the part of the prison barber that he, too, is a Christian — something straight out of the catacombs and almost unbelievable in" a country that, before the Communist takeover had been 95 per cent Christian!

The cardinal pays touching tribute to his mother who was only allowed to visit him at great intervals, but who was his “gleaming star” during those long dark days. It was her prayers and his unshakeable faith which helped the Cardinal to endure the tortures and the hopelessness of confinement.

The last chapter of the Memoirs is devoted to a detailed account of Rome’s efforts to convince the cardinal to leave Hungary and to Rome’s willingness to meet the demands of the Communist government in matters relating to the Hungarian Church. Rut Cardinal Mindszenty is critical of this approach:

“The history of Bolshevism, which already goes back more than half a century, shows that the Church simply cannot make any conciliatory gesture in the expectation that the regime will in return abandon its persecution of religion. That persecution follows from the essential nature and internal organization of this ideology.” (p. 244)

m iiiairrwwaeBwaaaaawawMMBMMMMwagii '■' nwirr tfii »n*1 ■■ West Warned of Soviet

Detente

By KINGSBURY SMITH Hearst Headline Service

LONDON — Some of Britain’s experts on international affairs are becoming increasingly dubious about detente -— the movement for relaxation of tension between the Soviet Union and the major Western powers.

There is a growing feeling that Russia has gained far more from detente than the West, and that the Soviet government is using detente to lull the West into weakness and to buy time to build up its own power.

Die British experts do not advocate an end to the detente movement, but they do believe t h e Western governments should adopt a much firmer position in dealing with the Soviets.

In talks with Lord Chalfont, former Labor minister of state for disarmament, and Robert Conquest, one of Britain’s most renowned Kremlinolo- gists, William Randolph Hearst, Jr., editor-in-chief of the Hearst newspapers, and the writer, found a strong belief that the Soviets have succeeded in using detente to advance substantially the cause of their ultimate objective -- which remains destruction of the capitalist system in the West and Soviet domination of the world.

Lord Chaifont is convinced the Soviets are using detente to try to split the Western allies. He views with grave concern the overwhelming superiority of Soviet Bloc forces in Northern and Central Europe, w here the Warsaw Pact has 70 divisions facing NATO’s 25. He points out the Soviet Bloc has 20J100 battle tanks against NATO’s 7,COO, and over 4,000 front-line aircraft opposing 2,000 in ihe West. “Hardly a week passes that new Soviet

tanks do not reach Central Europe,” he told us.

Lord Chalfont shares the view of Conquest and other students of Russian foreign policy that the Soviets are maintaining military superiority on the Central European front not in preparation for an attack against the West but for the purpose of retaining control of Eastern Europe and -exerting political coercion against the Western European ailies.

“No one should be deluded that those Russian tanks are there for ceremonial purposes,” Lord Chalfont said. "A more realistic assessment of their role may be their own — ‘Standing by to shake the tree when the rotten fruits are about to fall.”

Conquest, a- former British diplomat and author of "Russia after Khrushchev”