William Penn, 1962 (45. évfolyam, 5-23. szám)
1962-08-15 / 16. szám
PAGE 8 August 15, 1962 William Penn LINCOLN AND THE HUNGARIANS By EDMUND VASVARY (This is copyrighted by the William Penn Fraternal Association and can not be reproduced in any way without permission,.) The people still expected Kossuth’s return, in company with Garibaldi and Stephen Turr, bringing an abundance of arms. The conspiracies of Pál Almássy and István Nedeczky clearly mirrored the state of affairs in the downtrodden country. Probably the only difference was that they jailed the conspirators, but did not execute them as they did ten years before. Béla Széchenyi kept a diary of the interesting trip and on the basis of this he wrote a small book of 157 pages, with the title: “Amerikai utam” —• “My American trip.” From this book we know some of the details of the trip and the personal observations of the participants. (The book was published in 1863 by Gusztáv Emich, the erstwhile bookseller and publishing partner of Julius H. Stahel-Számvald, who alreadly was a general in the Northern army.) In the book Béla Széchenyi tells what they saw, heard and experienced, “told as inspired by common sense.” The two Hungarians admittedly fully sympathized with the cause of the South. The book quotes, motto-like, the assertion of the British Prime Minister Gladstone: “The South wants independence. Is it possible to find a nobler motive?” The general conditions are described by the Hungarian aristocrats thus: “Unbelievable public debts, unbearable burdens, freedom is known in name only, newspaper editors are thrown into prison, newspapers curtailed or suppressed by the President, spies are employed, private letters opened, I ask, can this be called freedom? Are not these sad distortions through the misuse of liberty?” “It is a depressing spectacle to see,” he continues, “that the North wants to deny the South the same self-government which it demands for itself . ..” The last presidential election, bringing the victory of Lincoln, did not satisfy the two travelers. “It can not be considered a presidential election, because in such a contest not the man, but the cause should be considered, which stands above the parties. Everybody knows that in electing Lincoln this did not happen . . .” According to the two young man, it was impossible that the North would be victorious over the South. Béla Széchenyi meditates thus: “But let us suppose that finally the North will be victorious in subjugating the South, which has a larger territory, will the Union be restored this way? itfill not the North be obliged to keep the losing party oppressed by force and bayonets, like the Russians keep the Poles in subjugation? What a pleasant comedy will this be in the name of the Union! Can such a government be stable which can deal with its opponent only on the battlefield? The North would have had a wonderful role if it had acted differently from the beginning, letting the South go on its way, pursuing its own destiny; this would have been the only way to steer it back to the Union. And in case this would not have succeeded, it would have gained a grateful nation as a neighbor. The Hungarian Diet acted more nobly and with more common sense toward the province of Croatia . . .” The travelers were, of course, informed about the fact that the Hungarians living in the United States at that time overwhelmingly espoused the Northern cause. To these Széchenyi directs the question: “How many Hungarians are standing on the side of the North with heart and soul? But did these people consider the fact that the North wants to deny the South exactly that which is most ardently desired by everyone for his own nation?” He talks about the emancipation of the slaves thus: “Is it possible, a la Lincoln, to proclaim that slavery is ended? But I ask: Has anyone the right to emancipate four million Blacks and thus ruin six million whites, who own them as a deplorable possession, having bought them with their own money?” He doubts whether in the future the United States will again be the standard-bearer of progress. “We are not allowed anymore to nurture the hope that the United States, reaching its full maturity, again will hold high the standard of progress which it so nobly carried in the interest of humanity and civilization for so many years.” Later he discusses the Negro and Indian question at length, accompanied by similarly naive remarks. He states that the Americans are all alike, at least in regard to knowledge and culture. “Nowhere else in the world can one find more, if not greater intelligence, than in the United States. But it is a curious experience to discover that just like bullets shot from the same rifle travel the same distance, one person knows just about as much as the other, not more and not less.” He sees with wonderment, however, the unbelievable progress the press has made in the New World. He notices that in the capital city of the state of Pennsylvania alone there are more newspapers published than in the entire Hungary. Young Széchenyi was also dissatisfied with the American clergymen. He mentions scornfully one of them: “Instead of preaching the word of God, he mouthed only imprecations against the Southerners . . .” He discusses at length the military system of the country, probably speaking only about the Northern forces, since he hardly could have had the opportunity to mingle with Southern soldiers. The army is new, and in his opinion, the soldiers are brave. Military leadership, however, is “extremely bad . . .” There are many Hungarians serving in the Northern army as officers, even colonels and generals. From these he knows that at the beginning it was impossible even to think of real discipline. The soldiers started to obey their officers only after they were soundly thrashed a few times. Unheard of is the pay they are getting, for nowhere in the world do the soldiers get higher pay. Among the officers are many ex-soldiers who were kicked out of European armies. The man who used to be a lieutenant there is a colonel here. He marvels at the railroads, hotels, public buildings, the water, sewer and plumbing systems everywhere, the wonderfully equipped fire fighting outfits, sadly comparing all these with the backwardness of contemporary Hungary. He enumerates the myriad problems and shortcomings of the Hungarian capital city, expressing the hope that maybe some day that city will have its own water system also. From hundred years ago the small book of the young count is a very interesting piece of work. It gives a fairly comprehensive picture of the opinion of the “higher circles” of Europeans about the life and conditions in the United States. Gyula Károlyi probably did not keep a diary, and we don’t know about any of his attempts to write about the American trip. His son, Michael Károlyi, speaking of his father in his memoirs, says that, according to him, the “good people” whom he met in America always or nearly always were Southerners. The son thought it necessary to emphasize that his father was talking about “good people,” and not about people who were simply cordial or pleasant. Fully one hundred years have elapsed since the two young Hungarian aristocrats surveyed, “on the spot,” the United States and its Civil War, during the most tragic and most fateful period of the nation's history. Those years were really fateful, not only in the history of the United States, but also as regards the future of world democracy. The aim, as we know, uppermost in the mind of Lincoln and the North, was not the emancipation of the slaves but the preservation of the Union, the saving of national unity for the future. In disruption there is always the danger of further divisions. Who knows how many weak, poor and hostile countries would today occupy the territory of the United States, even if they did speak the same language, as in South America where more than twenty nations live next to each other, speaking the same language, struggling with the same type of weakness and poverty, fearfully expecting the day when their precarious peace will wanish? History, during the past hundred years, has justified Lincoln, who was born in a log cabin, and not the palace-born aristocrats. CHAPTER SEVEN The battle of Piedmont, Virginia (June 5, 1864) The first great event of the Civil War connected with Hungarians was undoubtedly the brilliant cavalry charge of the Frémont Body Guard October 25, 1861, near Springfield, Mo. led by Major Charles ZÁGONYI. The other such important event was the victory of the Union forces near Piedmont, Va. on June 5, 1864, won by Major General Julius H. Stahel-Számvald. For this victory and for the gallantry demonstrated during the ten hour battle, the General was decorated 29 years later with the highest distinction of the nation, the Congressional Medal of Honor. In spite of his comparative youth (he was then 40 years old), of being a foreigner and a non-professional soldier, STAHEL-SZÁMVALD was already a Major General of Volunteers, commanding the First Cavalry Division, Department of West Virginia, and its chief of staff, commanding also the infantry division of General SULLIVAN. As for his age, he was almost a boy compared with his superior, Major General DAVID HUNTER (1802-1886), who then was already 62. For a high ranking officer, there could hardly have been a more difficult and trying service than to serve under General HUNTER. We have a very detailed and evidently accurate description of this man, shared by practically everyone who knew him. He was a robust, stubborn and irascible man who had unpleasant relations with almost everybody. “His mentality was dominated by prejudices and antipathies,” we are informed, “so intense and violent as to render him incapable of taking fair, unbiased view of many military and political situations.” He was eternally complaining of real or imagined grievances and slights, disobeying orders of his superiors, a thoroughly obstreperous, cantankerous and well-nigh intolerable individual. As a West Point graduate he was a professional soldier, abysmally contemptuous of the “ineffective amateurs” with whom he was compelled to operate. Some years previously he was a reckless duelist, who even challenged his commanding officer to a duel and he was saved from expulsion from the army only by presidential clemency. He even dared write rude and insolent letters to President LINCOLN, who in one of his answers wrote to him: “You are adopting the best possible way to ruin yourself.” On the other hand, he was a brave, “resourceful, energetic and aggressive man, who never swerved when his mind was made up.” No officer assigned to serve under him could have anticipated fairness, trust or good will from £uch a superior. HUNTER took over the commandery of the West Virginia Department from General SIGEL May 21, 1864. Immediately on the following day he applied for two experienced brigadiers, at the same time trying to block the possible appointment of General STAHEL-SZÁMVALD, about whom he stated in this letter: “He has but little experience as a cavalry officer in this country, nor am I aware that he has any experience with cavalry elsewhere.” On the same day HUNTER sent a telegram to the Chief of Staff, General HALLECK, saying: “It would be impossible to exaggerate the inefficiency of Gen. STAHEL,” and requested an experienced cavalry officer. With the same breath he recommended that his nephew, Lieutenant Samuel W. STOCKTON, a cavalry officer of the regular army, be advanced to Brigadier General of the Volunteers. This request, however, was denied and, in spite of his malicious remarks, General STAHEL-SZÁMVALD was assigned to him with General SULLIVAN. The outcome of the impending battle was considered important because if the Union forces lost the entire Shenandoah Valley would be open toward Maryland and Pennsylvania, before the Southern Army, and also would constitute a real threat to the safety of the capital itself. (To Be Continued)
