Fraternity-Testvériség, 1957 (35. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1957-07-01 / 7. szám
FRATERNITY 5 fied” party has the same structure as the pre-revolution party had. It is a hierarchical structure with a Moscowite Politbureau at the top of the ladder. In this structure the rank and file have no other right but to give the stamp of approval to anything and everything decreed by the top leadership. Though the pre-revolution regime of Rakosi-Gero enforced the most rigid and inflexible controls, the party was torn by factionalism. It is sufficient to refer to the case of the Titoist Rajk and other devi- ationists or to the fact that Janos Kadar himself was for years in prison during Rakosi’s dictatorship. But we could also refer to Imre Nagy and his New Course. Just before Kadar’s first official visit to Moscow, an article written by Joseph Révai, the party’s chief ideologist during the Rákosi regime, revealed that the new party is not void of factionalism, pressures from the right and left either. The causes of new splits and the pace of their growth may throw additional light on the inherent weakness of the monolithic system. V. But there are other issues of great importance which were highlighted by the Hungarian revolution. One of them relates to the integration of the Soviet bloc countries. It has been clear that the economic and cultural agreements between the Soviet Union and the East European satellite regimes, just as the Warsaw military pact, have served two purposes: the first, to exploit the natural resources, the technical knowhow and the manpower of the East European countries for the benefit of the Soviet Union and to further Moscow’s goal for world domination. The second purpose has been to make them all economically dependent on the Soviet Union and militarily a part of the Soviet security system. The Hungarian revolution proved that neither political nor economic or military ties forced on an unwilling nation can serve as a reliable basis for thorough integration. The Rakosi-Gero clique which ruled Hungary until the revolution was so secretive regarding deals between the Hungarian regime and Moscow that not even high officials in government departments knew exactly what other government agencies had to deliver to the Soviet Union. Important evidence of this came from Professor Janossy, leading Hungarian atomic scientist and former Vice Chairman of Hungary’s Atomic Energy Commission, who on November 1, 1956, three days before the Soviet tanks re-entered Budapest, made the following statement in an interview on the Budapest radio: “Now the Hungarian uranium ore enterprise is in Hungarian hands. The Soviet engineers and their families have left Kovago-szollos (a mine near Pecs, where the mines are located). The mine is being guarded by soldiers of the revolution — Hungarian soldiers . . . The Soviet authorities closely guarded anything connected with uranium. They were reluctant to take in Hungarian scientists, let alone experts. So it was impossible to do any prospecting. The Hungarian experts were left in the dark. I, the Vice Chairman of the former Atomic Energy Commission, received no information. I know only from the papers of the deposits T
