Fraternity-Testvériség, 1952 (30. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)
1952-03-01 / 3. szám
TESTVÉRISÉG 17 attention. With the crushing of the Magyar’ war for freedom, came Haynau and his blood hounds, at the sight of whom the whole of the civilized world stood aghast. As history records: “As soon as Haynau’s terrorism quieted down, even civilian administration followed the pattern of the armed despotism initiated by Count Schwarzenberg. From 1851 on, Archduke Albrecht was head of the state as governor. Under him, an enormous, sprawling and costly bureaucracy was set up, with an army of political police which had, as its chief task, the control of the Hungarian public and the checking of every popular movement. The civil genius behind this huge organization of intimidation was Alexander Bach, after whom it was named the “Bach System”, Originally a barrister and agitator in the Vienna Revolution, he turned overnight from a radical orator into an unquestioned master of censorship, intrigue, denunciation and a colossal machine of political informers and concocted trails — as imperial minister of internal affairs. He planted Hungary through and through with his trusted Austrian and especially Czeh officials. These were derided and hated by downtrodden Hungarians, who nicknamed them “Bach’s Hussars.” The bureaucracy they established was characterized by corruption, lack of intelligence, and extremes that bordered on the tragicomic.” 6) Desirable as it may seem to be at this point, a more detailed treatment of the question of Czeh valor, as exemplified in the just related events, must be deferred until its discussion will better fall in with the sequence of events to be taken up presently. (6) The great mass of documentary evidence unearthed after the close of World War I, makes it as clear as daylight that the coming of that war could have been prevented by at least three world powers, namely by Russia, France and Great Britain. Real war guilt falls on the two nations named first. Allusion has already been made to the fact that Russia’s war aims had been formulated several years before the outbreak of hostilities. Let us, for the sake of better perspective, bring in more concrete evidence as regards Russia’s war aims. It is on record that: “In the spring of 1902 a military agreement is concluded between Russia and Bulgaria for the promotion of the interests of the Balkan's Slavic peoples. The fifth paragraph of this agreement candidly admits that the final success of these efforts will be attained only as a result of a succesful war against Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the fall of the same year a Russian delegation visited Bulgaria, headed by Prince Nicholas Nikolajevics who publicly stated that Russia was ready for active participation in Balkan affairs. Rumania’s winning over to Russia’s side was deemed an indispensable condition of the success of the project, and a French publicist, Mr. Cheradame by his name, readily advanced the idea that the easiest way to effect this end was the handing over of Transylvania to Rumania as a recompensation for her friendly services in furthering these ambitious moves.” 7) Even a superficial survey of the mass of documentary evidence pertaining to Russian war aims will disclose the fact that the real target of the Slav expansionist drive was not so much the whole of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as its eastern half — Hungary. In the fashion of Slav thinking, Hungary has ever been looked upon as a thorn in the flesh of Slavdom. A paragraph in the work of the celebrated Czeh historian, F. Palacky, makes this fact perfectly clear. Says Palacky: “The invasion of the Magyars and their establishment in Hungary is one of the most important events in the history of Europe. It is the greatest misfortune that has befallen the Slavonic world during thousands of years. The Slavonic races in the ninth century extended from the frontiers of Holstein to the coast of Peloponesus, much divided and disconnected, varying in habits and circumstances, but everywhere able, diligent, and capable of instruction. In the middle of this extended line a center has been formed by Rotislav and Svatopluk, round which, both by inner impulse and through the force of external circumstances, the other Slavonic tribes would have grouped themselves.” 8) While the historical worth of the Czeh historian’s above given statement will hardly bear serious investigation, so much, however, is sure that its message caught the imagination of his Czeh compatriots and, in the mode of accepted Slav thinking, was followed up by the postulate that the destruction of Hungary, the thousand years old kingdom of Saint Stephen, was a self- evident sine qua non of unblemished Slav bliss. Fantastic though it may sound to western minds, the wiping off of Hungary from the face of the earth became gradually a definite design in Slav thinking. When, in the year of 1909, the masters of “Holy Russia” elevated “Golden Prague” to full partnership in the Pan-Slav drive for world domination, this step meant that the signal, not only for the liquidation of Christian Hungary, but for the liquidation of the whole of the West as well, had been issued. (7) The formulation of American war aims came in January 1918, when President Wilson issued his famous Fourteen Points. As regards the future of Austria-Hungary, Mr. Wilson’s declaration contained the following statement: “The people of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development.” Three days before President Wilson’s declaration was issued, British Premier Lloyd George summed up his view on this point by stating: “The break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims.” 6 7 8 6) Dominic G. Kosáry, A History of Hungary, Cleveland, Ohio, The Benjamin Franklin Society, 1941, pp. 251, 252. 7) Eugene Horváth, History of Hungary, Budapest. More detailed statement on Professor Horváth’s book is lacking and unavailable on account of Iron Curtain conditions. 8) Quoted in Count von Liitzow’s Bohemia, a Historia! Sketch, J. M. Dent & Sons. London, 1916, p. 18.
