Fraternity-Testvériség, 1949 (27. évfolyam, 1-12. szám)

1949-02-01 / 2. szám

TESTVÉRISÉG

7

tractual agrarian labarers and share croppers (zsellérek), their economic position was to remain virtually unchanged for over half a century. Other laws abolished censorship and introduced jury trials for press offenses, declared the equality of religious denominations, sanctioned union with Transylvania, established a national red-white-green tricolor, and assured the continued functioning of county assemblies.

The revolution so far had been predominantly constitutional and social. The changes effected seemed radical only according to local standards; in comparison with Western institutions they seemed mild and long overdue. There is no evidence that Kossuth at this time was contemplating more far-reaching changes. The gradual leftward shift in his position and the corresponding increase in the influence of his radical reform wing came about in consequence of external and internal resistance came from the camarilla in Vienna, which had consented to the abolition of the status quo only under duress and was planning to recoup its lost position at the first favorable opportunity; internal opposition reached its most dangerous form among the national minorities, who by this time had also been infused with the spirit of modern nationalism and who refused to accept the concept of a unitary Hungarian nation-state in which hegemony was to be vested in the Magyars. It was perhaps Kossuth’s basic mistake that he failed to reckon with the awakened nationalism of the non-Magyar inhabitants of the Hungarian Kingdom and that he did not foresee the next logical step of the Hapsburg camarilla: the exploitation of anti-Magyar resentment among the minorities to bring about a re-estab- lishment of the status quo ante.

The most articulate of these minorities were the Croatians, whose country had been a kingdom “associated” with Hungary since the twelfth century in approximating the same relationship existing between Hungary and Austria. Ten days after the revolution in Pest, a Croatian national committee in Zagreb openly demanded the revision of the existing connections with Hungary and the establishment of a parliamentary Croatian nation-state. The leader of the Croatian movement was Baron Joseph Jellach- ich, pro-Hapsburg and anti-Magyar, upon whom Vienna, five days after the appointment of the Hungarian Cabinet, was quick to bestow the office of Croatian Banus (viceroy). Jellachich was a formidable military leader who could easily enlarge his command of Imperial regiments by the addition of Croatian irregulars, this military threat to the new Hungarian state was made acute by the nationalistic agitation among the Serbs of upper Hungary, and the Rumanian of Transylvania. In the choosing between the Hungarians and their Rumanian neighbors, the Transylvanian Saxon also cast their

lot against the new government in Budapest. Prime Minister Batthyány recognised the threatening danger and in May ordered the recruitment of a national guard of 10,000 men for “the defense of throne and country”. In the meantime open revolt had broken out among the Serbs, and the camarilla, determined to bring the Hungarians to their knees, was engaged in negotiations with Jellachich. By July the alliance between Vienna and the minorities became quite obvious and Kossuth, in splendid outburst of oratory, informed the House in Budapest that “the country was in danger” and asked that the legislature should grant permission and appropriations for the raising of a National Defense (Honvéd) army of 200,000 men, of whom 40,000 would be put in the field at once. When on July 11 the House granted the request, the die was cast. The rest of the summer was spent in preparation for conflict. On September 4 an imperial epistle to Jellachich gave the signal for an Austro-Croatian invasion of Hungary across the river Drava.

The ensuing 12 months saw the great struggle which was to electrify the West and liberals everywhere. Under impact of military invasion the Hungarian revolution gradually turned into a war for independence; this trend was accompanied by a growing radicalization of the national government. The fact that the war could last 12 months was primarily due to the organizing genius of Kossuth, who, as the head of the newly formed Committee for National Defense (established by Parliament on September 21), appeared before his countrymen as the incarnation of the national will to victory and freedom. Jellachich’s march was arrested a few miles from the capital, on the northern shore of Lake Velence, by small Hungarian Army of fresh recruits; whereupon the Banus wheeled around and began a westward retreat with the pursuing Hungarians at his heels. Having escaped into Austria, however, Jellachich joined forces under the walls of rebellious Vienna with the army of Field Marshal Prince Windischgratz. — At Schwechat the two Imperial Armies joined battle with the Hungarian forces, whom Kossuth had ordered across the frontier to effect a relief of revolutionary Vienna. There, on October 30, the Hungarians were defeated and forced to retreat into Hungary. On the following day Vienna capitulated to Windischgratz. The road to the Hungarian capital lay open, and at the end of December the victorious Austrian commander began his invasion. At his approach Kossuth and the government fled to Debrecen, and the Prince entered Pest on January 5, 1849. The cause of Hungarian liberty seemed lost.

From this critical juncture forward Kossuth had to share credit for the successful prolongation of the war with the brilliant young Arthur Görgey. A retired Imperial officer, although