Századok – 2001

TANULMÁNYOK - Majoros István: A lengyel-szovjet háború. Wrangel és a francia külpolitika 1920-ban III/533

568 Paris avait donc la conviction qu'avec la mise à pied de l'armée polonaise on pourrait repousser et vaincre les forces soviétiques. Dans ce travail le général Weygand avait un rôle important, mais la victoire sur les soviétiques était polonaise et les origines de la légende de Weygand se trouvait dans la politique intérieure polonaise et française après la bataille de Varsovie. C'est dans le cadre de la guerre et de la politique française en Pologne que l'étude présente Wrangel et ses ambitions en Crimée. Millerand espérait qu'on pourrait profiter de la victoire polonaise et des forces de Wrangel pour ruiner définitivement le pouvoir soviétique. Mais cette espérence n'était pas réalisée, parce que la Pologne a conclu une paix préliminaire avec Moscou en octobre 1920. On peut connaître ensuite les motifs poussant Moscou à supprimer Wrangel, puisqu'il était considéré plus dangereux aux yeaux des dirigeants soviétiques que la Pologne indépendante. L'étude se termine par l'analyse de Maklakov, ambassadeur russe à Paris sur la Russie et les relations parmi les puissances européennes. Le diplomate russe esquisse, un peu au nom des diplomates français, les dilemmes des pays vainqueurs et tout d'abord ceux de la diplomatie française sur les années à venir. Cette étude était basée sur les documents des archives du Quai d'Orsay, du Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre et du Service Historique de la Marine à Paris. THE POLISH-SOVIET WAR, WRANGEL AND THE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY IN 1920 by István Majoros (Summary) The study begins with the statement that the Polish-Soviet war threatened to undermine the political system created by Paris to counterbalance Germany as well as the whole international political order established by the victors at Versailles. This meant that the very security of Europe was endangered. This situation resulted from the fact that whereas the Soviet considered Poland as a possible corridor leading to revolution in Germany, and thus wanted to expand westwards, Warsaw reclaimed the borders of 1772 and tried to create a block of powers between the Baltic and the Black Sea in order to maintain the independence of Poland between Moscow and Berlin. The study analyses the causes leading to the war, considérés briefly the war itself and also the diplomatic struggles that preceded the military conflict. It also examines the diplomatic relationship during the war in the Paris-London-Warsaw triangle, between England and France, between the Entente and the Soviet, and deeds with the role of Germany and of the countries of Central Europe in the conflict. Since England wanted to establish commercial relations with Moscow, it did not support the expansive foreign policy of Poland which menaced to undermine the English plans towards the Soviet. Although Polish independence was crucial to France, its government nevertheless warned Warsaw to moderate its ambitious foreign policy. When the war began with a Polish offensive on 25 April 1920, both Paris and London regarded Poland as an agressor. Following the Soviet counter-attack both powers exhorted Warsaw to make peace, although London was also willing to accept the extension of Soviet influence over Poland. Paris was ready to help Poland, but this help was limited to the dispatch of equipment and military experts. The French government refused to send troops because it feared that the Germans might try to use the Polish-Soviet war in order to enforce a revision of the peace treaty of Versailles. Moreover, General Foch thought that the superiority of the Red Army was far from overwhelming and thus a reorganised Polish army could halt the Soviet offensive. Although General Weygand did play a predominant role in the organisation, the victory at the Vistula was the success of the Polish army. The legend of Weygand was the result of the complex internal situation both in Poland and France. In connection with the Polish policy of Paris the study examines the ambitions of Wrangel in the Crimea. Millerand thought that the military victory of the Poles and the forces of Wrangel could be used to overturn the Soviet regime. His hopes were not realised, however, for in October 1920 the Polish government signed a preliminary peace treaty in Moscow. The study also examines those reasons which explain that the Soviet government regarded Wrangel as more dangerous than the independent Polish state and thus wanted to destroy him as soon as possible. The study ends with the analysis of the Soviet ambassador in Paris, Maklakov, on the situation in Russia and in Europe in general. The diplomat articulated those dilemmas concerning Poland and Russia which seemed most acute to the French foreign policy as well. The study is based on documents from the Quai d'Orsay, the Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre and from the Service Historique de la Marine.