Századok – 1999

Tanulmányok - Ádám Magda: A versailles-i Közép-Európa összeomlása IV/685

726 ÁDÁM MAGDA nion portant sur la Subcarpatie au début de mars. Quelques jours avant son entrée à Prague, il autorisa la Hongrie à l'occupation du territoire. Il subjugea cette action à sa politique envers la Slovaquie. Les événements de mars, conséquences logiques de Münich ont détruit non seulement la Tschécoslovaquie mais toute l'Europe Centrale de Versailles. THE COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL EUROPE AS CREATED AT VERSAILLES By Ádám Magda (Summary) The author introduces the international and local developments that buried under themselves Czechoslovakia, the strongest state of Central Europe created twenty years earlier at Versailles. The antecendents included the peace treaties after the First World War, the policy of the Great Powers, the changes in international power relations and their impact on the successor states, especially on Hungary. The study concentrates on the policy of the Darányi, Imrédy, and Teleki governments concerning Czechoslovakia. The military and political block created against Hungary narrowed down the scope of these governments and contributed to the cautious treatment and final rejection of Hitler's motion for a German-Hungarian cooperation against Czechoslovakia. The suggestions of the western powers, primarily England, for a Hungarian-Czechoslovakian reconciliation pointed to the same direction. Darányi and especially Imrédy, who strove to strengthen relations with Britain, could not disregard these efforts. The more so because they had reliable information as to the willingness on the part of Great Britain and France to support the peaceful revision of the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian border. Imrédy adopted Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and wished to keep the country away from another war in Europe at all costs. He sticked to this standpoint to the very end, even when he theoretically accepted Hitler's proposal for a German-Hungarian military cooperation. With the exception of Czechoslovakia all states along the Danube advocated Chamberlain's policy of appeasement, even Czechoslovakia's allies in the Little Entente. Yugoslavia and Romania agreed, namely, with the revision of the Czechslovakian borders along ethnic lines that manifested itself in the Munich and Vienna Awards. The Munich Conference did not solve the Hungarian question but created the preconditions of fulfilling the Hungarian demands concerning Czechoslovakia. The Supplement of the Munich Pact left the settlement of the Hungarian question to direct negotiations between the countries concerned. However, the negotiations failed to bring about a settlement but a four-power conference was nevertheless not convened because Hitler was against it. His will was accepted both by the western powers and Italy. So at the conference in Vienna it was only Ribbentrop and Ciano who decided the question of the Hugarian-Czechoslovakian border. They drew the borderline according the national principles. The Vienna Award did, however, not satisfy the Hungarian government circles as Sub-Carpathia was not reannexed to Hungary despite its importance from geopolitical point of view. Imrédy and Teleki carried on energetic activities for its reannexation. All Hungarian governments in the course of the Czechoslovakian crisis strove to achieve the revision of the borders but thought differently of the ways of doing it. When Darányi and Imrédy returned from Germany, they were ready to join Germany in a military action against Czechoslovakia. Darányi was quite determined but Imrédy did his best to avoid concrete action. Teleki preferred to achieve the Hungarian goals without Hitler's support, relying on Italy and the western powers instead, or even by a peaceful agreement with Prague. He started negotiations with the government of the so-called Second Republic of Czechoslovakia and promised compensation for Sub-Carpathia. However, Berlin arrested the process. Despite his former promises to reannex Sub-Carpathia to Hungary, Hitler was now against it. Right after the Munich Pact he did not want to disregard the nationality principle accepted there, by which he had managed to win the western powers and their public opinion over. Moreover, he was aware that the common Hungarian-Polish border sought for by Hungary, Poland, and Italy would be detrimental to the German interests. In early March Hitler changed his mind once again. A few days before his advance on Prague he assented to Hungary's occupation of Sub-Carpathia because he came to see the whole question as part of his plans concerning Slovakia. The events of March, the logical consequences of the Munich Pact, buried under themselves not only Czechoslovakia but also the whole of Central Europe as conceived at Versailles.