Századok – 1937

Pótfüzet - HEGEDÜS LORÁNT: Lord Beaconsfield politikai ügynökének jelentései gróf Andrássy Gyula és Tisza Kálmán politikájáról a keleti válság idejében 576–616

86 HEGEDŰS bORÁNT. [62] Be that as it may, I have not been deterred, since my return from Vienna, from visiting, unostentatiously of course, such of my old friends as I knew would be capable of giving me a clear account of the recent discussions in the Diet, and of the tactics pursued both by the Government and the Opposition in the Debate in which M. Tisza made his remarkable declarations. I will endeavour to reduce what I have heard to a very brief summary. The defeat of the Opposition by a majority of thirty-six in the debate on M. Tisza's Circular on the right of holding Public Meetings, is attributed by them principally to bad discipline ; but in part also to the fact (of which their Leaders seem to be persuaded), that a successful attack on the Government can be made only upon a question of Foreign Policy — such in which it would be practicable to rouse the national enthusiasm, and appeal to the national pride and patriotism. Such an opportunity was afforded, it was believed, by the vote for the credit of sixty millions. It is true that the Diet would have had no constitutional right to refuse supplies already granted by the Delegations ; but it would certainly be justified in declaring its opinion upon the policy in support of which the credit should be employed, and of protesting against its being appropriated to purposes (such for instance as the occupation of Bosnia), for which the Country has unmistakably manifested the strongest aversion. With this object M. Uerményi proposed an amendment in the following sense : "This House, while accepting the extraordinary credit of sixty millions voted by the Delegations, at the same time declares : that it considers dangerous any policy which has not for its object the consolidation of International European Right by the repression of the attempt made in the Treaty of San Stefano to extend Russian domination, and to partition Ottoman territory ; a policy which would be opposed to those Powers which are seeking the common good. This House declares that it would consider the occupation of any part of the Ottoman Empire, effected without the sanction of the said Powers, as a phase of the policy which it condemns." The substance of the speech which the announcement of this resolution elicited from M. Tisza was at once telegraphed by Your Excellency to Her Majesty's Government. I need not here enlarge upon it. It cut away in a great measure the ground upon which the Opposition meant to fight ; and left them no alternative but the eventual withdrawal of the motion. Count Albert Apponyi indeed pointed out that M. Tisza, in stating that the objections of the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Treaty of San Stefano referred to the clauses affecting the Eastern, as much as to those relating to the Western portion of the Balkan Peninsula, had not given any indication of what those objections were ; and that their importance was therefore left in doubt. He also remarked that M. Tisza's declarations about Bosnia were simple equivocations ; and M. Uerményi went so far as to say that the Country (it would have been un-Parliamentary to have said the House), would not believe the Minister's statements. But under the circumstances it was clear that the resolution could not be pressed to a division ; and the Opposition had to be content with the knowledge that they had at any rate driven the Prime Minister to be more outspoken than Prince Auersperg had been in his speech to the Austrian Reichsrath ; and to use