Századok – 1937

Pótfüzet - HEGEDÜS LORÁNT: Lord Beaconsfield politikai ügynökének jelentései gróf Andrássy Gyula és Tisza Kálmán politikájáról a keleti válság idejében 576–616

80 HEGEDŰS bORÁNT. [62] ally, and leave her, isolated, to the consequences of her over-confidence. That such has been the language employed by Count Andrassy to the members of the Delegations ; and by Count Andrassy's friends and creatures to the Deputies of both Legislatures, there can be in my mind no doubt. There is no doubt, either, that it carried the desired weight, and that it only began to lose its effect when the military and naval preparations made by Her Majesty's Government assumed such proportions as to leave no doubt of their resolution to resist the pretentions of Russia, if necessary, by force. I have reported in my previous correspondence the demonstration made in the Lower House in favour of an alliance with Great Britain ; and Your Excellency is aware of the impression produced upon Mr. Tisza, and of bis hurried journey to Vienna for the purpose of personal consultation with Count Andrassy. It is not for me to estimate the extent to which His Excellency's decisions may have been effected by this demonstration ; but it is evident that the public at large is by no means satisfied that Count Andrassy has in any appreciable degree made an approach to an intimate understanding with Great Britain. On the contrary the recently revived rumours of an approaching occupation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina ; the announcement, believed in spite of all denials, that Count Zichy had demanded the consent of the Porte to such a measure, and the declaration, ostentatiously put forward, that it would become necessary to employ Austro-Hungarian troops for the repatriation of the refugees, have inspired the public with the dread that Count Andrassy still leans to the Russian policy of partition ; or at any rate to such a method of protecting the interests of the Empire as may be found in territorial compensation. The idea of any such action, which would imply at any rate a partial acquiescence in the proposals of Russia, is utterly abhorrent to public opinion in Hungary. The eventual annexation of the two Provinces is beginning to be regarded as inevitable. In whatever way it may be effected it will be a calamity for the Empire ; but it will be a tenfold worse calamity if brought about as a corollary to the principles upon which Russia is acting. The leaders of the new Coalition apprehend that unless Count Andrassy's hand is forced, it will be in this sense that the annexation will take place ; and this they are determined to exert their utmost strength to prevent. I do not find that they are by any means anxious to bring about Count Andrassy's downfall. Most of them would, on the contrary, desire that he should remain in office ; but that he should remain for the purpose of executing the wishes of Hungary, and of the large majority in Austria. To thus end they see no other means than the defeat and consequent retirement of Mr. Tisza, and all his colleagues ; and the installation of a Government which will not only not allow itself to be "cozened" by Count Andrassy — (I am using the sort of language that is used to me) — but will insist upon His Excellency's taking count of the national will, especially in the matter of a definite and intimate alliance with England. In my original report of the nature of the new Coalition I expressed an unfavourable opinion both of its composition and of its chances of cohesion. Further enquiry has led me to make considerable modifications in my previous estimate. In the first place I had not made sufficient allowance for the strength of the distrust of Count Andrassy and rancour against Mr. Tisza which animates the whole Party. The first of these sentiments is indeed by no means confined to the opposition — but is very generally felt. throughout the House.