Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 2. szám)
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282 Marius Diaconescu win the king's support). The recollection of the Bulgarian states - which initially were vassals but afterwards were occupied by the sultan - was too vivid in the collective memory to allow Mircea and the Wallachian feudal elite to make any other political choice. Wallachia was integrated as a buffer state in the global defensive system created by Hungary. This defensive strategy was initiated by Sigismund immediately after the defeat of the crusaders at Nicople and was put into practice after 1402. Mircea the Old and Wallachia set the example during the years 1394- 1396. Mircea's interventions in the internal conflicts from the Ottoman Empire granted him fame and notoriety, attested both in Turkish chronicles and Bulgarian lore. But, at least in 1416, the Hungarian king was present behind Mircea's scheming. A Transylvanian army lead by the Voivode of Transylvania joined Mircea's troops in his failed attempt to impose Mustafa. At the same time, Mircea the Old lead a duplicitous policy meant to ensure his position in case his suzerain's pressures might endanger it. He concluded for several times alliances with the king of Poland, the Hungarian king's enemy on grounds of their dispute over Louis I's legacy. These alliances were obviously defensive because their clauses were to be put into practice - theoretically - only if and when one of the parties were attacked by the Hungarian king. They were supposed to be secret but, taking into consideration the Lithuanian proposals for an anti-Ottoman pact (1415) which came to be known by the Hungarian authorities, we may assume that other such agreements did not remain unknown. Duplicitous policy - common practice of Byzantine diplomacy - secured a balance between Sigismund's pressures, Mircea's status of vassalage and his tendency to gain his independence - or at least autonomy. We can assume that, in a first stage, Mircea accepted de facto the Hungarian's king suzerainty. Then, under Ottoman pressure and after being driven away from his throne, his submission attained the highest degree especially in the period lasting from 1395 to 1402, since Mircea depended on Sigismund's support to regain his power. A less tensed situation at the southern borders because of the Ottoman domestic conflicts allowed Mircea to lead a more independent external policy and, between 1408 and 1412, to even break the bond of vassalage. But, after the treaty of Lublau, which settled the disputes between the kings of Poland and Hungary, Mircea had no other choice but to acknowledge once more Sigismund's suzerainty. The relations of vassalage established between the Wallachian voivode and the Hungarian king is part of the more common feudal practice of the period. They should be interpreted in the light of the medieval mentality rather than under the influence of the Romanian-Hungarian relations in the past two centuries. Translated by Cristina Felea.
