Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 2. szám)
Relaţii internaţionale
254 Marius Diaconescu off the Hungarian sphere of influence45. Now, Mircea resorted again to this political maneouvre, the Polish king being a sort of ideal ally - at least theoretically - against the Hungarian claims of suzerainty. Consequently, this alliance was concluded under Sigismund’s pressures who had inherited the suzerainty claims over Wallachia together with his crown46. The Wallachian voivode's diplomatic duplicity was meant to safeguard to a certain extent the northern borders. At the same time, taking advantage of the declining situation of the South-Danubian states, Mircea initiated territorial expansion on his own to the south of the Danube. It is very possible that strategical reasons might have laid behind the invasion of the state led by Dobrotici and of the region surrounding Silistra, in 1388. That same year the sultan had started a campaign in order to bring under control the Christian states situated to the south of Danube, which not long before had rebelled against him47. Mircea's enterprise set the relations between the Ottoman Empire and Wallachia on a permanent basis. The participation of Wallachian soldiers at the battle of the plain of Kossovo in 1389, together with the Christian coalition, has been an extremely debated historiographical issue48. Serbian documents should have but did not mention the Romanian participation along with the other participants. The political reasons, which motivated the decision of non-involvement, are impossible to judge solely on the basis of conjectures49 *. However, Wallachia had to bear the direct consequences of the Christians' defeat. Hence the campaign led by Firuz bey, which took place some time during the first half of the year 13905" and was part of a series of Turkish plundering incursions meant to intimidate both the members of the Christian alliance and other potential enemies. The pressures and threat exerted by the Ottomans at the defense line of the Romanian south borders brought about an improvement of the relations between the Romanian voivode and Sigismund. Mircea's incursion to the south of the Danube against the ‘Akinjis’ (irregular cavalry) in Karinovasi - a diversionist enterprise carried out most probably at the 45 M. Diaconescu, op. cit. (see note 35), pp. 32-35. 46 P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bătrân (see note 15), p. 232, stated that Mircea felt threatened by Sigismund because he had occupied the Transylvanian lands of Amlaş and Făgăraş. The historian does not take into account the claims of suzerainty inherited by Sigismund from his Angevine ancestors. 47 T. Gemil, Românii şi otomanii în secolele X1V-XVI (hereafter referred to as: Românii şi otomanii), Bucureşti, 1991, pp. 65-67. 48 P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bătrân (see note 15). p. 219, on analysing Serbian sources, claims that there was no such contingent in the battle. N. Şerbănescu, N. Stoicescu. Mircea cel Mare (1386- 1418). 600 de ani de la urcarea pe tronul Ţării Româneşti, Bucureşti, 1987, p. 275, etc. T. Gemil, Românii şi otomanii (see note 47), p. 68, claims the contrary. For references and sources dealing with this issue see: V. Motogna, op. cit. (see note 13), p. 34; Anca Iancu, Ştiri despre români în izvoarele istoriografice sârbeşti (secolele XV-XVII), in Studii istorice sud-est europene, I, ed. by E. Stănescu. Bucureşti, 1974, p. 16-17; T. Gemil, Raporturile româno-otomane în vremea lui Mircea cel Mare (hereafter referred to as: Raporturile româno-otomane), in voi. Marele Mircea Voievod, ed. by E. Pătroiu, Bucureşti, 1987, pp. 335-336. 49 P. P. Panaitescu, Mircea cel Bătrân (see note 15), p. 219, claims that Mircea refused to participate at the Christian coalition so as not to irritate Sigismund. 11T. Gemil, Românii şi otomanii (see note 47), pp. 70-71.
