Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 2. szám)
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198 Tamás Pálosfalvi marched into Wallachia, dethroned the pro-Ottoman voivode and restored the Hungarian influence in the Wallachian principality. It has been well known for a long time that the Ottoman attack did not come unexpectedly: king Wladislaw had been alerted several months before by the Ragusans47. In view of this the Hungarian chronicler's statement, generally accepted by the historians, according to which the voivode arrived in Transylvania shortly before the invasion, seems rather surprising48. It would have been natural for Hunyadi to stay in his province and prepare his army for the defence and recruite mercenaries, which was indeed be the case before his later campaigns49. We would of course be in a much better situation if we could reconstruct the voivode's itinerary in the critical months; unfortunately, we have no evidence at all about his movements between 8 January, when he stays at Csanád, and 8 April50, when his presence is attested at Turda; then follows another gap before the voivode turns up again in Braşov on 25 May51. Yet, as his presence, unlike that of his co-voivode, Miklós Újlaki, is not attested in king Wladislaw’s campaign against the city of Pressburg, which took place precisely in the first months of 1442, we have no reason to suppose that he was withheld in the king's service and consequently could not return to Transylvania on time. The only possible solution is that Hunyadi thought that the great Ottoman attack would once again be directed against Belgrade and consequently prepared himself to thwart it somewhere near the city. This hypothesis, though as yet impossible to prove, would account for the voivode's absence from his province and for his late arrival there after the Ottoman troops had successfully entered Transylvania52. It is also difficult to explain how the Ottoman troops were able to invade Transylvania "unexpectedly" despite the fact that not only a whole system of border defence but also spies had been in operation since at least 143353. This defensive system must have been but strengthened in view of the fact that no warning could be hoped for from the pro-Ottoman voivode of Wallachia. The Hungarian authorities must also have leamt from the tragic consequences of the 47 Diplomatarium relationum reipublicae Ragusanae cum regno Hungáriáé, Budapest, 1887, pp. 437-439. 48 "Hanc funestam eiusdem exercitus Thureorum ante erupeionem paucis diebus Johannes wayvoda in ipsas Transsilvanas partes venerat..." Johannes de Thurocz: Chronica Hungarorum. I. Textus. Edd. Elisabeth Galántai, Julius Kristó, Budapest, 1985, p. 244. 49 None of the historians dealing with this problem ever tried to find an explanation for the voivode's seemingly incomprehensible absence from his post on the eve of the attack. See L. Elekes, op. cit. (see note 35), p. 149 and O. Székely, op. cit. (see note 46), p. 5. 50 DF 253.595. We will later return to this highly interesting charter. 51 On 3 January 1442 he is at Torda, Zimmermann-Wemer, Urkundenbuch (see note 33), V, no. 2431. On 8 January we see him at Csanád: Dl. 55.242. Then he disappears and does not emerge again before 8 May and then again on 25 May when he stays at Braşov: DF 246.905. 52 The Ottomans may have deliberately spread the rumour of a general attack against Hungary and then profit from the voivode’s absence to attack his unprotected Transylvania. 53 O. Székely, op. cit. (see note 46), p. 6.
