Diaconescu, Marius (szerk.): Mediaevalia Transilvanica 1998 (2. évfolyam, 1. szám)
Relaţii internaţionale
30 Marius Diaconescu Although, as it has been said, the fact that the king was over the Danube on the 12th of November, in front of the Severin citadel does not imply a siege as well. Much more plausible would have been the attack over the citadel from the northern bank, taking into consideration that the king possessed a bridgehead at Mehadia. The defeated king retreated because of the winter, a period not fit for a military campaign. The retreat forced by the cold weather also results from the letter written by the Romanian knezes of the Sebeş district, who were saying that they had guarded in the mountains until the winter came. On the other hand, the date of the releasing of the nobiliary army, which was strictly regulated outside the country, had been previously set, from the beginning of the campaign, on the 4th of December 1368155. The letter from the 4th of December 1368 by which the king completely forgave his castle owners from the three Bulgarian citadels, Vidin, Lagan and Belogradcik, in the situation in which they would have been obliged, because of different reasons, to surrender them156, is also part of the same context, of giving up the campaign because of the winter and of the releasing the army to retire. The king finished the campaign defeated, but he was surely thinking of coming back in spring. He did not put aside the objectives of the campaign, as the numerous garrisons left back in the citadel of Mehadia, and the further development of the event show. The Romanian voivode took advantage of the statu quo established after the failure of the Hungarian campaign. During the next winter Vladislav Vlaicu took over Vidin. The information about this campaign of the voivode is available only from chronicles written later, which requires a certain limitation in using them. The Franciscan chronicle1S7 states that Vladislav Vlaicu entered Vidin following the local population's call, so he didn't conquer the city by force. Mauro Orbini's chronicle, fulfilled over two centuries since the events, states exactly the contrary, and colourfully enriches the episode including a possible deportation of the population over the Danube158. The fact we can helpfully use from Orbini's chronicle is the resistance of the Hungarian garrison in the citadel of Vidin. The two chronicles do not exclude each other, because the Hungarian inhabited the citadel and Genovese soldiers whereas the neighbouring city was inhabited by the native Bulgarians. Another valid information is the one concerning the returning of the Hungarian king and the Romanian voivode's retreat from Vidin. Maria Holban's contestation of the authenticity of the information is not justified159. The same letter sent by the knezes of the Sebeş district from 1369 shows that they had 500 of their best soldiers in the citadel of Mehadia "until the king's arrival" ("insuper nos cum quingentis hominibus collectis melioribus similiter usque ad reversionem domini noştri regis ibi in Mihald mansimus")160. We cannot exactly determine which the DRH, D., I, pp. 91-92 and the note 1 (p. 92). 156 Történelmi Tár, 1898, p. 366. 157 Chronicon observantis provinciáé Bosnae Argentínáé, in Starine, Agram, t. XXI-XXII, p. 11, apud Maria Hóiban, op. cit., pp. 190 şi 193-194. 158 Mario Orbini, II regno degli Slavi, p. 470, apud Maria Hóiban, op. cit., p. 194, the note 127. 159 Maria Hóiban, op. cit., p. 194, the note 127. 160 DRH. D.,\, pp. 96-97.
