Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
Peter Učen: Approaching National Populism
Peter Učeň of) some liberal-democratic norms of political conduct for the sake of programmatic radicalism and a political domination. Typically, they act in polarized polities with adversarial pattern of political competition - characteristics to which they purposefully contribute. ‘Mainstream populists’ are ‘populistic’ because they treat the competing elites in a populist manner as wrongdoers and enemies of the nation/people. Their populism ascends ‘on the top’ of their traditional ideologies. With centrist populists they share denigration of post-communist elite, but, being a part of establishment, they apply this judgement only to their political rivals. In their diction they ask, in more or less explicit form, for revocation of initial ‘transition pacts’ between the parting communists and ascending new elite which often decisively shaped the ground for departure from Communism in respective countries. They blame those pacts for de facto failure of revolutions and for post-communist societies being dominated by the communists turned democrats and capitalists. They emphasise that influence as the reason for malaise affecting the societies concerned. They call for a renewal, for a restoration of the possibility of attaining the revolutions’ goals, in terms of décommunisation and moral revolution. Various kinds of moral and institutional overhauls (namely the lustration) are suggested to do away with the dominance of the ‘postcommunists’ and their liberal accomplices. As for Basescu, his anti-establishment drive is free from nationalist (nativist) appeals. Fidesz and PiS, in turn, in their - politely said - ‘conservative nationalism’ in various regards resemble the populist radical right’s vision of politics. Yet, their disdain for liberal limits is still constrained by the international concerns, and their nationalism is, largely for the same reasons, not a full-fledged nativism.14 They, namely Fidesz, are phenomena in development with various possible trajectories to take. iMpliCATl'ONS of tIhE CftOSEN CIaSSÍfICATÍOIN It is argued here that exactly the latter two groups of parties of the transition populism category - the communist successor parties and ‘proper’ national populists - represented a crux of national populism as a movement in 1990s. While different in various regards, namely the extent of the favourable reference to the previously existing regimes - their appeals bore similarity as to the symbiosis of social demagoguery, populism and nationalism. “The national populist parties address the people as members of a national community, and contend that their misery is caused by external enemies and treacherous local anti-national elites who push through reforms demolishing the living standards of the masses” (Učeň 2007a, 53). 26