Petőcz Kálmán (szerk.): National Populism and Slovak - Hungarian Relations in Slovakia 2006-2009 (Somorja, 2009)
László Öllös: Time for Hungarian-Slovak Dialogue (Conclusion)
László Ollós nitely more complicated. Therefore, it is highly desirable to spread the part of Hungarian culture that deals with mutual relations between Central European nations on a regular, as opposed to occasional, basis. It is also highly desirable to distribute studies, films, documentaries and everything that may further mutual understanding - all this in Slovak language, of course! It is generally desirable that Hungarian culture and its personalities are presented in Slovak. Hungarian intellectuals should consider publishing their works also in neighbouring nations’ languages because it is at least as important as publishing in world languages. The Hungarian nation lives and will continue to live in this region. Furthermore, the basis for Hungarian argumentation in potential discussions should not be grievances and wrongs of the Hungarians but those of the neighbouring nation - in this case the Slovaks - including prejudices of the nationalized public. After all, changing these prejudices should be the principal objective of such discussions. The Slovak-Hungarian reconciliation would be necessary even if neighbouring countries were completely free of ethnic Hungarians. Members of ethnic minorities are not the only ones in need of national reconciliation, although they suffer the most from its absence. The point is that Hungarian constitutionality is not only related to constitutionality of neighbouring countries inhabited by ethnic Hungarians but directly concerns it. Both sides tend to believe that the other side is the source of national threat, which profoundly affects people’s notions of nation and state, creation of the image of enemy, their concepts of preferred political systems and human rights of both the Hungarians and neighbouring nations. Instead of hostility stemming from the feeling of threat, neighbouring states co-inhabited by ethnic Hungarians should embrace a long-term strategy of friendship with the Hungarians and alliance with Hungary. In order to launch a public debate on such a strategy, it must first be formulated. The attempts to conjure up the apparition of Hungarian threat are not bound to encounter meaningful resistance until a new national doctrine is born. Without such a doctrine, even politicians with a moderate position on the so-called Hungarian issue can do nothing but pursue a more reasonable and more tactical minority policy that is accepted abroad and does not hamper the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration but simultaneously preserves existing national inequality. So, although these politicians oppose harsh and aggressive anti-Hungarian sentiments,8 they actually contribute to undermining ethnic minorities and even eliminating them in the long term.9 Before their political supporters, they dissociate themselves from the radicals in terms of tactics but not in terms of the essence. While this political constellation does not prevent ethnic Hungarian parties from participating in 256
