Sárospataki Füzetek 14. (2010)

2010 / 1. szám - TANULMÁNYOK - Byl, John: Világnézetek háborúja: a keresztyénség és kihívói.

War of the Worldviews

Scientific theories are not only equally unprovable, and equally improbable, but they are also equally undisprovable.4

Lakatos contends that no scientific theory can ever be conclusively proven, since we have no justifiable criteria that can definitely establish such truth. Since, in principle, an infinite number of theories are possible, the probability of any particular theory being correct is one out of infinity, which is zero. Nor can any theory ever be conclusively disproven, since it is always possible to “save” a theory by inventing suitable secondary theories.

To illustrate the last point, Lakatos tells the following story:

The story is about an imaginary case of planetary misbehavior. A physicist of the pre-Einsteinian era takes Newton’s mechanics and his law of gravitation, (N), the accepted initial conditions, I, and calculates, with their help, the path of a newly discovered small planet, p. But the planet deviates from the calculated path. Does our Newtonian physicist consider that the deviation was forbidden by Newton’s theory and therefore that, once established, it refutes the theory N? No. He suggests that there must be a hitherto unknown planet p' which perturbs the path of p. He calculates the mass, orbit, etc., of this hypothetical planet and then asks an experimental astronomer to test his hypothesis. The planet p' is so small that even the biggest available telescopes cannot possible observe it: the experimental astronomer applies for a research grant to build yet a bigger one. In three years’ time the new telescope is ready. Were the unknown planet p' to be discovered, it would be hailed as a new victory of Newtonian science. But it is not. Does our scientist abandon Newton’s theory and his idea of the perturbing planet? No. He suggests that a cloud of cosmic dust hides the planet from us. He calculates the location and properties of this cloud and asks for a research grant to send up a satellite to test his calculations. Were the satellite’s instruments (possibly new ones, based on a little-tested theory) to record the existence of the conjectural cloud, the result would be hailed as an outstanding victory for Newtonian science. But the cloud is not found. Does our scientist abandon Newton’s theory, together with the idea of the perturbing planet and the idea of the cloud, which hides it? No. He suggests that there is some magnetic field in that region of the universe, which disturbed the instruments of the satellite. A new satellite is sent up. Were the magnetic field to be found, Newtonians would celebrate a sensational victory. But it is not. Is this regarded as a refutation of Newtonian science?

No. Either yet another ingenious auxiliary hypothesis is proposed or . . . the whole story is buried in the dusty volumes of periodicals and the story never mentioned again.5

In the same vein, the American philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine has concluded:

Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system. The totality of our knowledge or beliefs, from

4 Lakatos Imre: The Methodology of Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press, 1980. 19.

5 Lakatos Imre: “Falsification and the methodology of scientific research programmes”, in

Critidsm and the Growth of Knowledge. Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgarve (eds.), London, Cambridge University Press, 1970. 100-101.

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