Sárospataki Füzetek 2. (1998)
1998 / 1. szám - Dr. Frank Sawyer: Is there a place for God int he inn of Philosophy?
The result is that such transcendental ideas as freedom, immortality, and God, are beyond the range of proof or disproof. Kant was trying to find a way to relate Newtonian physics with views on human freedom, morality and religion. IS THERE SUCH /1 THING /15 PURE REASON? Kant’s views have been subjected to much debate and detailed evaluation. Without entering into such far-reaching debate, we take note here of a major concern. Dooyeweerd (among others) suggests that Kant was unaware of his own ’dogmatic’ startingpoint: he did not first clarify to himself the relationship between epistemology and ontology before he wrote his Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 1 One of the results of this is that Kant could only find certain knowledge in universal concepts; he did not know how to deal with concrete, experiential judgments. The Romantic movement rebelled against this. So we must choose: is there only a ’cognizing subject’ (I think - ego cogito) that is not much more than a ’pure logical function’; - or (against the rationalist tradition), should we rather not speak about a richer, fully integrated T, which involves the total selfhood of a person? (My choice is for the second.) In any case, the logical, theoretical act of knowing can never give us the totality of meaning, since it is one aspect among others. Besides the ’I think’, there is also ’I feel’, ’I act’, ’I believe’, 'I hope’, ’I go dancing’ or ’I prefer football to stamp collecting’, etc. Reality is very concrete, very specific. There are many ’wider than logical’ experiences which contribute to our knowledge! So Dooyeweerd says that Kant has made the mistake of accepting ’the absolute self-sufficiency of the Vernunft’, and this glorification of reason is a ’religious postulate’, an act of faith. It leads to, or comes from, the dogma that reason (theoretical thought) is the bestower of truth. In other words, truth is then always ’logical’, a matter of the Vernunft, not a matter of feelings, social relationships, or for example, aesthetic intuition. We must think this through carefully. But may we not reply that Kant is merely delimiting the range or function of theoretical knowledge in his Critique of Pure Reason, and that we must turn to his Critique of Practical Reason in order to hear what Kant says about morality and God, and the importance of things not bound by Vernunft? This is too generous, for the damage S7s liiere a piacé for SOocf..? 1 Dooyeweerd, A New Critique, vol.II, part II: The Epistomologica Problem in the Light of the Cosmonomic idea, pp 429ff. This is noted by Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 6, p.99. 29
