Cseh Valentin szerk.: „70 éve alakult a MAORT” – tanulmányok egy bányavállalat történetéből (2009)
Tamás Magyarics: The United States and the Issue of MAORT's Nationalisation
Tamás Magyarics H a nga ricin Institute of International Affairs The United States and the Issue of MAORT's Nationalization The United States' foreign policy after World War One was characterised bv distancing itself from assuming international political responsibility: the country never joined the League of Nations (Société des Nations) despite the fact that Woodrow Wilson may be considered in official terms if for nothing else - its 'founding father'. This stand off from high politics was further reinforced through what are known as the neutrality Acts that were adopted in sequence from the middle of the 1930s. The 'reluctant giant', however, was far less reserved in the economic domain. It is true that Washington introduced high protective duties through a law enacted in 1922 and one in 1930, and this customs policy - mistaken according to the opinions of most economists - was followed suit bv several leading industrial countries, but the United States exported the achievements oi what we refer to as the second industrial revolution of the 1920s to a large degree, through other, more conventional products. Car production, the electronics industry, and the entertainment business stands out from even these 'new' branches of industry —this was when Ford or Hollywood became American symbols. American presence in economic policy was also substantial, at least at the level of advisors: at first it was the Dawes, then later on the Young Plan that attempted to offer assistance in structural problems, and the burden that restitution obligations entailed. Hungary received a League of Nations loan of a more substantial amount for establishing its stable national currency with the able assistance of the USA and Britain in 1924, and it managed to achieve this under the leadership of Jeremiah Smith - who hailed from Boston - in two years: the Pengő became one of the most stable national means of payment throughout Europe thereafter. American capital investment did not play a significant role in Central Europe after World War One. This region was of secondary significance from Washington's point oi view, whether on account of its geopolitical position (fundamentally in the sphere of Germany's interests) or in light of its economic potential (the lack of large quantities of natural resources or a substantial market). Add to this the fact that the policy calling for revision, which permeated almost all of Hungarian society 7 , moreover certain elements of social-political conditions that were considered backward from the American perspective, furthermore the effective counterpropaganda conducted by the countries surrounding Hungary- - and Czechoslovakia in particular - did not improve the image that had generally evolved of Hungary; in general terms we may say that US-Hungarian relations remained at a rather low level throughout the period between the two world wars. One or two investments of greater significance from Hungarian perspective having been made in Hungary does not fundamentally change this situation either; among these, the incorporation of the first more substantial Hungarian oil company, Hungarian-American Oil Industries Ltd. (MAORT) on July 15, 1938, with one hundred percent American capital is the one that
