Folia Theologica et Canonica 7. 29/21 (2018)
Lectio magistralis
18 S.E.R. FRANS DANEELS, O.Praem. ceptional and, after the introduction of the so called processus brevior, most probably will become extremely exceptional, if not purely hypothetical. It would seem that this kind of declaration of nullity of marriage was considered as an administrative matter because the normal rules of the judicial trial were not observed, without prejudice to the requirement of moral certainty. Perhaps the question of the nature of such declaration of nullity has to be reconsidered after said introduction of the judicial processus brevior. e. One last remark about the administrative function This function requires immense work. The constant concern of the Apostolic Signatura in this field is that the faithful everywhere have the real possibility of obtaining justice without delay and without exaggerated costs, and the poor without cost. But there are still several regions in which all this has not yet been achieved. The recent reform of the process of matrimonial nullity, introduced by the Sovereign Pontiff Francis by the motu proprio Mitis Iudex Dominus Jesus'" and the motu proprio Mitis et misericors Jesus", constitutes a real challenge for all the Bishops concerned to organize the pastoral care prescribed by artt. 1 -5 of the Ratio procedendi, and to offer the faithful an accessible, prompt and correct administration of justice. All this obviously presupposes that the tribunals have the necessary resources and well-prepared ministers. Conclusion It must be concluded that the Supreme Court of the Apostolic Signatura is placed at the highest level of the administration of justice by reason of both its judicial and its administrative competences. It finds its unity in the fact that it is concerned for the observance of the law injudicial proceedings, in administrative-contentious causes and in its administrative function concerning ecclesiastical tribunals. The fact that it is concerned for the law, that is, for legitimacy, does not mean at all that it defends the law for the sake of the law itself, but that it defends the law in order to protect justice. That it finds its unity in spite of its various competences, without confusing them, is explained by the fact that this unity is limited by the care for the law, by the defence of legitimacy. 10 11 10 AAS 107 (2015) 958-970. 11 AAS 107(2015)946-957.
