Folia Theologica et Canonica 6. 28/20 (2017)
IUS CANONICUM - Peter Artner, Psychical imputability and punishability in the current penal system of the Canon Law
PSYCHICAL IMPUTABILITY AND PUNISHABILITY 239 though his psychical imputability is limited. In this case we can find the relation between the alcohol consumption and the offence. If the lack of the use of reason is culpable, meaning, directly intended or not avoided if avoidable, it does sufficient imputability of the delinquent act committed in this state, although it may be diminished.47 48 In the third case when the person drinks alcohol just to be brave enough to commit a crime, which he would not commit while he is sober although his imputability is limited, he is fully responsible for his deed. As Can. 1325 says: “drunkenness or other disturbances of mind cannot be considered if they are sought deliberately in order to commit or excuse a delict". Canon 1325 precludes certain offenders from deliberately taking advantage of some of the previously mentioned imputability-exempting or mitigating factors to exclude themselves from penal imputability, i.e. to be punished.4* In such a case, for example when the person was unaware and somebody intoxicated him and he lost his self-control completely, and committed a crime is not responsible for his deed because he acted involuntarily as he was not imputable psychically. In several cases it may be problematic to prove if the offender was out of control because of alcohol, drug or any temporal mental illness, if these all were temporal. If the crime happened only once, we may say that this case was an “only once a lifetime” occasion, we have to say that he was psychically not imputable, and the accused is to be set free. But if he has committed the same or similar crime several times and wants to defend himself always with the lack of imputability we have to be at least suspicious and accept the presumption of the Canon law and not the statement of the offender, even it is supported by any evidences. If a doubt of imputability is raised by the evidence, the prosecution does not have to dispel it. In case of the positive outcome of a Preliminary Investigation shows the accused guilty, the ordinary has to decide to start a penal procedure or not, and even if the procedure is completed the ordinary or judge has to decide if any penalty is to imposed or not. Although in c. 1341 imputability is not mentioned, this is evident from the canonical penal system, if the imputability is limited the ordinary is not obliged, or may say is forbidden to start a penal process or apply any penalty. If he starts the process, he or the judge must judge the facts: a presumption is not a fact, though the presumption of imputability cannot be judged automatically, but as this is a presumptio iuris, if the contrary cannot be proven, the imputability is to be taken as granted. 47 Marzoa, Á. - Miras, J. - RoDRfGUEZ-OcANA, R. (ed.), Exegetical Commentary, IV/1.284 (Mar- ZOA, Á.). 48 Beal, J. P. - Coriden, J. A. - Green, T. J. (ed.), New Commentary, 1545 (Green, T. J.).
