Folia Theologica et Canonica 6. 28/20 (2017)
IUS CANONICUM - Peter Artner, Psychical imputability and punishability in the current penal system of the Canon Law
PSYCHICAL IMPUTABILITY AND PUNISHABILITY... 237 tions, however diminished; in some cases, while freedom may be limited, it is not totally absent. 1 ) The punishment of a person who had only the imperfect use of reason at the time of the delict is to be tempered. The person is punishable, but the punishment is to be diminished or substituted. Who completely or habitually lacks the use of reason is not able to commit a delict. Who has the use of reason but imperfectly, so his imputability is not total, is to be punished with a lighter penalty. In such a case the offender’s personal responsibility is reduced, but not eliminated. This may happen when someone suffers from some kind of mental illness or developmental disorder.42 * (Nr. 2. will be skipped again and explained later on). 2) [Nr. 3] Acting from grave heat of passion which did not precede and hinder all deliberation of mind and consent of will and provided that the passion itself had not been stimulated or fostered voluntarily is an extenuate circumstance, too. Grave heat of passion (such as love, hate, desire, aversion, delight, sadness, hope, boldness, desperation, fear, anger or irascible appetite) can limit the imputability. Its effect upon imputability depends upon whether it is culpable or inculpable.41 In such cases the person does not act freely, his thoughts and will is under the influence of the heat or passion. If the passion is deliberately stimulated and nourished becomes an aggravating circumstance. Number 4-5-6 and 8 are almost the same as the parallel points in Canon 1323, so those explained there are valid here, too. 3) [Nr. 7] If a person acts against someone who gravely and unjustly provoked him or her, his offence is to be punished with a lesser punishment. This is similar to the self-defense, just without any physical harm or damage. Such provocation attenuates the imputability of the offender and the penalty for the violence. 4) [Nr. 9] The fact that a person without negligence did not know that a penalty was attached to a law or precept, may not affect the psychical imputability. Contrary to Can. 1323, nr. 2, the offender do knows that he or she is going to violate a divine or ecclesiastical law or precept, just he or she does not know about the punishment attached to the law or precept. 5) [Nr. 10] If the offence is committed by a person who acted without full imputability provided that the imputability was grave, can be punished with a less severe penalty. Similarly to Can. 1323, nr. 7 the Legislator provides another diminishing circumstance for those who have grave but not full imputability at the time of committing the crime. This partial lack of imputability can be tem42 WoESTMAN, W. H., Ecclesiastical Sanctions am! the Penal Process, 32. 45 Marzoa, Á. - Miras, J. - Rodri'gcez-OcaSa, R. (ed.), Exegetical Commentary, IV/1.289 (Mar- zoa, Á.).
