Folia Theologica et Canonica 2. 24/16 (2013)
SACRA THEOLOGIA - Sebastian Walsh, O.Praem., “Fidelissimus Discipulus Eius”: Charles De Köninck’s Exposition of Aquinas’ Doctrine on the Common Good
"FIDELISSIMUS DISCIPULUS EIUS” 133 that most intelligible and proper concept of the common good most relevant to wisdom. As we shall see, it is precisely because Professor De Köninck was keenly aware of these three difficulties that he is such a valuable guide to understanding St. Thomas’ doctrine on the common good. II. Approaching an Understanding of the Common Good Our first experience of goods, the first things to which we give the name “good,” are sensible goods and the pleasures that accompany them. Ice cream and warm hugs are good in this sense. We find that we have a natural desire to possess them and rest in them. As we grow and become aware of things beyond the realm of sense experience, we start to recognize that we also have a desire for these non-sensible things as well: we desire our parent’s love and approval; we desire justice (children, even at a very young age, will insist that they be treated fairly); we desire to know the truth. These things are not the same kind of things as sensible goods, but since they too are objects of our desires, we give them the same name “good,” but with the vague realization that they are not good in the same sense of the word. After some time, as we reflect more upon our experience of the world, we recognize that in all things there seem to be natural inclinations to act and be acted upon. Rocks tend downward. Plants tend to grow and reproduce. New life, seeds and embryos, tend to develop from the imperfect toward the perfect. We see that they tend toward determinate ends, and because those ends are like the objects of our desires, we call them “goods” as well. And so a new meaning of the word “good” comes to be, different, but related, to our original meaning. We say that it is good for a tree to bear fruit and even for a rock to be down. This final application of the term good is universal, and one could even say “metaphysical,” since it is applied to all beings: it belongs to being, as being. Bound up in our experience of these different but related goods is the experience of cause and effect. We notice that these goods are somehow a cause of the actions (and sometimes even the very being) of the things for which they are good. The good ice cream is a cause of my opening the freezer and scooping a heaping bowlful for myself after dinner. This is not to deny that sometimes goods can also be effects. But observe that even when we notice that some good is an effect, it is also a cause in a different way: The good music is an effect of the skill of the musician who produces it; but it is also the reason why he acquires and employs his skill. Health is the effect of walking, but it can also be the cause for which someone walks. Natural things too appear to act for the sake of goods, as if the good is somehow a cause of the activities or being of natural things. Even if philosophers of nature and natural scientists disagree
