Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 43. (1993) - Festschrift für Rudolf Neck zum 65. Geburtstag

WILLIAMSON, Samuel R. Jr.: Confrontation with Serbia: The Consequences of Vienna's Failure to Achieve Surprise in July 1914

SAMUEL R. WILLIAMSON, JR.

CONFRONTATION WITH SERBIA: THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIENNA’S FAILURE TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE IN JULY 1914

The Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, fell victim to a Bosnian assassin on 28 June 1914. By 4 July the senior Habsburg policymakers, with a single exception, were prepared to consider war against neighboring Serbia whom they held (correctly) responsible for the murders. On 6 July the German government indicated its support for Habsburg action against Serbia regardless of the possible European consequences. Only Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza continued to resist the press to go to war, and even he had weakened his opposition by the end of the Common Ministerial Council on Tuesday, 7 July. Thus within nine days the Austro-Hungarian government appeared ready to take action, and quickly, against Belgrade. Yet nothing happened. Not until 23 July, more than two weeks later, would Vienna give the Serbian authorities a forty-eight hour ultimatum that could not possibly be accepted.*

Why did Vienna squander this time before acting? Why did it cast away a chance for surprise attack? Why allow the other European capitals to conclude - at least initially - that Austria-Hungary did not intend to avenge the Serbian behavior? These questions have repeatedly puzzled historians of the July 1914 crisis. Now, new archival material, a clearer appreciation of signals intelligence, and the publication of the Serbian diplomatic documents permit new perspectives on these important questions. The answers to them in turn allow the historian to consider a broader question: how this failure permitted Vienna’s potential antagonists - Serbia and Russia (and the Anglo-French entente) - the opportunity to prepare for a forthcoming Habsburg attack?* 1)

* The author is indebted to Generaldirektor Dr. Kurt Peball for his assistance while serving at the Kriegsarchiv, and that of his senior associates, especially Dr. Peter Brou- cek.

1) On Austro-Hungarian policy in the July crisis, see F.R. Bridge, The Habsburg Monarchy among the Great Powers, 1815-1918 (Oxford, 1991) and his chapter in Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918, vol. VI: Die Habsburgermonarchie im System der internationalen Beziehungen, pt. 1, eds. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch (Vienna, 1989); S.R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War (London and New York, 1991); Jean-Paul Bled, Fran^ois-Joseph (Paris, 1987); Jósef Galántai, Die Österreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie und der Weltkrieg (Budapest, 1979). Also see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, trans, and ed. Isabella Massey, 3 vols. (London, 1952-57).

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