Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953—1955

sions and disagreements in the State Department and the Pentagon over the position to take on Austrian neutrality. In Berlin, Dulles presented the basic American position following Eisenhower’s advice:

A neutral status is an honorable status if it is voluntarily chosen by a nation. Switzerland has chosen to be neutral, and as a neutral she has achieved an honorable place in the family of nations. Under the Austrian state treaty as heretofore drafted, Austria would be free to chose for itself to be a neutral state like Switzerland. Certainly the United States would fully respect its choice in this respect, as it fully respects its choice in the respect of the Swiss nation.

But at the same time Dulles reminded the Austrians that if the neutrality was imposed on a nation from the outside, „it was „no longer a sovereign and independent state“51). Dulles essentially argued that in „special circumstances“ self-chosen neutrality was acceptable, but a neutralization imposed from outside was not52). Swiss neutrality, according to Eisenhower’s proviso, meant armed neutrality.

Molotov, however, was still not prepared in Berlin to sign a treaty with Austria. Ueopold Figl, the new Austrian Foreign Minister, tabled an Austrian offer not to allow any military bases on its soil, or to join in any future alliances. Yet Molotov linked a final pull-out of occupation troops from Austria with the conclusion of a German Peace Treaty53). Dulles cabled home to Eisenhower that Molotov’s presentation had destroyed all lingering hopes for an agreement on Austria54). Waiting for a German Peace Treaty, however, meant waiting for Godot.

Dulles reported to the National Security Council after his return from Berlin that the Austrians were prepared to „neutralize their country.“ Dulles reported that Molotov had brushed the hint aside in the most brutal fashion and that Figl and his delegation had walked out of the

51) Nineteenth Plenary Session, 19 February 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 VII/1 1088-89. For a draft of this statement, with Dulles’ handwritten changes, see „Draft of Statement by John Foster Dulles,“ 13 February 1954, Folder „Berlin Four-Power Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1954,“ Box 78, Dulles Papers Princeton University. It is almost certain that Dulles drafted this statement by himself, personal interview with Robert Bowie (head of the Policy Planning Staff), 25 February 1988, and Phylis Macomber (Dulles’ personal secretary), 26 February 1954. For an opposing view see Rathkolb Von der Besatzung zur Neutralität 395.

52) On Dulles’ legalisitic approach to the question of Austrian neutrality, see also Stourzh Towards the Settlement of 1955 179.

53) On Molotov’s objections (after Figl’s presentation) in the 18th meeting of 12 February 1954, FRUS 1952-1954 VII/1 1061-65. On good summaries of the Berlin CFM, see also Stourzh Staatsvertrag 116-25, and Kurth Cronin Great Power Politics 129-36.

54) Dulles to Eisenhower, 13 February 1954, Folder „February 1954 (1),“ Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower Library.

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