Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)
BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955
The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953-1955 Treaty, „an embittered Austria would never prove a reliable ally for the United States.“ The U.S. could not impose its point of view, neither on the Austrians nor on the French and British, if they went along with the Austrians43). Scholars usually have pointed to Dulles’ strong opposition to neutrality. He once called it „lukewarm.“ But Dulles’ views of neutrality were ambiguous. In special circumstances like Austria, the shrewd lawyer Dulles could be much more pragmatic than he has usually been given credit44). By the time the Foreign Ministers convened their Council in Berlin in February 1954-the first CFM since Paris in 1949-Western statesmen were hardly enthralled by the idea of a neutral Austria; they rejected outrightly the idea of a military vacuum in Austria after the withdrawal of occupation troops. At the same time they realized that it would be impossible to talk the Austrian Government out of accepting the neutral option, if the Kremlin offered neutrality as a means to secure its signature for an Austrian Treaty. III. Stalin’s death allowed East and West to overcome some of the worst Cold War tensions. In the summer of 1953, an armistice agreement was finally signed in Korea. Churchill never got his summit with the Soviets, but as a consolation prize, the Western leaders met in Bermuda in December 1953. Agreement was also reached to go ahead with a foreign ministers’ meeting to discuss East-West issues, including the Austrian Treaty. Nobody less than President Eisenhower him self-the celebrated World War II supreme commander and first commander of NATO forces, with 43) FRUS 1952-1954 VII/2 1910-11. The basic American position towards a neutralization of Austria was outlined in NSC 164/1 of 14 Ocotber 1953. The U.S. position on the Austrian Treaty should be to „Vigorously resist the neutralization of Austria as contrary to the U.S. interest. However, should the Austrians, British and French press strongly for accepting some degree of neutralization, the United States may be required to make some concession to avoid the onus of unilateral blocking a Treaty,“ ibid. 1914-22 (quote 1918). Rathkolb has also pointed out the importance of this meeting, see Von der Besatzung zur Neutralität in Bevormundete Nation, ed. by Bischof/Leidenfrost 391-93. Rauchensteiner only briefly mentions the earlier version NSC 164 Die Zwei 214. 44) On this point, see my Dulles and Austrian Neutrality unpublished Proceedings of the Dulles Centennial Conference-, Stourzh Towards the Settlement of 1955 1 79-80. Similarly for the Third World, Dennis Merrill has shown in the case of India how Dulles’ moral absolutes gave way to increased tolerance for the nonaligned perspective, see his „Eisenhower, Dulles, and India: Accomodating Immoral Neutralism, 1953-1958,“ unpublished paper presented at the American Historical Association annual convention, 1987. 379
