Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42. (1992)

BISCHOF, Günter: The Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955

tion forces. The turmoil in the Kremlin leadership after Stalin’s death and Raab’s probings-through Norbert Bischoff, his trusted ambassador in Moscow-of changing Soviet intentions in Austria, set the stage for the final rounds of negotiations in Berlin and Moscow. Stourzh sees the Kremlin and the Ballhausplatz as the two decisive actors in the final two years of State Treaty negotiations.

Stourzh has also noted the concern and „discomfort“ of the Western powers about the bilateral Austrian-Soviet diplomatic contacts (1952- 54) and negotiations (1955)9). In a recent article Stourzh contests the view that the Soviets’ Austrian policy might have served as a bait for Germany. He argues that an analysis of the timing demonstrated that „by the time the Austrian question was seriously negotiated and settled, West Germany’s entry into NATO was irreversible.“ The Soviets, says Stourzh, accepted Germany’s entry into NATO as a fait accompli10). Manfried Rauchensteiner in his most recent book on the Great Coalition has presented some new evidence from British and American archives on Western unease about Austrian neutrality and Raab’s bilateral negotiations11). On the basis of exhaustive research in American archives, Oliver Rathkolb has stressed how the top American military leadership and the U.S. State Department resisted any „neutralization“ of Austria as a solution to the stand-off about the Austrian State Treaty12). Meanwhile a younger generation of American authors-unThe Anglo-American Powers and Austrian Neutrality 1953—1955

9) Stourzh Staatsvertrag 140, 206, footnote 20.

10) Gerald Stourzh The Origins of Austrian Neutrality in Neutrality: Changing Concepts and Practises, ed.by Alan T. Leonhard (Lanham-New York-London 1988) 52; different in Staatsvertrag 140. For the opposing view that Austria served as a „bait“ for German public opinion, see Stearman Soviet Union 164-67; Bader Austria between East and West 206; Audrey Rurth Cronin Great Powers Politics and the Struggle ewer Austria, 1945-1955 (Ithaca-London 1986) 136-42.

11) Manfried Rauchensteiner Die Zwei: Die Grosse Koalition in Österreich 1945- 1966 (Vienna 1987), 209-18, 267-68; and idem Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich 1945 bis 1955 (Graz-Vienna-Cologne 1979)329-30. Robert Knight has just briefly hinted on American and British apprehensions about Austro-Soviet bilateral negotiations in 1955, see British Policy towards Austria 1945-1955, Ph.D. dissertation (University of London 1986) 257-58. Rauchen Steiner, it seems, is missing the ambiguity of the U.S. position and the dynamics of changing U.S. views about Austrian neutrality over the period of two years as a result of a changing international environment, when he asserts that the United States „belonged to the strictest opponents of Austrian neutrality“ (ibid. 209). Dulles’ position, for example, was not clear-cut. He rhetorically rejected „immoral neutralism“ and opposed neutrality imposed on a country by the Great Powers; but he found neutrality, if it was voluntarily chosen by a nation, acceptable, see Stourzh Towards the Settlement ofl 955 179-80, and Günter Bischof, Dulles and Austrian Neutrality, (see footnote 15).

12) He notes that „Sowohl das Department of State als auch die Joint Chiefs of Staff überboten einander in Argumenten gegen die Neutralisierung,“ see Oliver Rathkolb

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