Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
Isolating the Isolator 185 difficult to heal, the question of the Austrian Emperor’s visit to the Quirinal. This is perhaps only a sentimental question, but it is one to which the Italian people attach great importance. Although the emperor of Austria hesitates to visit the Quirinal, yet his relations with the Vatican have not been, are not, and probably will not be for some time to come particularly cordial. The accidental quarrel between Baron von Aehrenthal and the Papal Nuncio has no doubt envenomed for the moment the relations between the Vatican and Vienna. But more serious opposition to Austria at the Papal Court is due to the antipathy of Cardinal Merry del Val to that country and to the personal pique which Cardinal Rampolla, the probable future pope, must undoubtedly harbour against the court whose influence excluded him from being elected pope at the last conclave. Much might, perhaps, be obtained through English influences in Rome to persuade the Vatican to see the error of its ways in foolishly flouting the one great catholic empire left in Europe to the advantage of the Protestant emperor of the North. In taking into consideration the possible developments of Austrian policy in the immediate future one must bear in mind that before long it is probable that a prince will ascend the Austrian throne whose character is involved in mystery and whose views and aspirations have as yet been but little studied by foreign diplomacy. There are many symptoms which tend to show that England could initiate a new policy with regard to Austria-Hungary on the accession to the throne of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. His wishes with regard to certain domestic arrangements might perhaps with advantage be met in an amicable spirit. Moreover, the ambitions of his wife might be fostered, as they are likely to lean rather towards the new developing national sentiments than to the old traditional German ideas. It might also be possible to inspire the Archduke with the desire, when he comes to the throne, of playing the role of the great Catholic Sovereign of the world. The increase of Slav and Hungarian influences in the Austrian empire and the decline of German influence, socially and politically, give an opening for sowing the seed which will lead to a revival of the ambitions of the house of Habsburg, and to a consciousness in the emperor that the opportunity again lies open before him to exercise a dominating influence in central european affairs. It would be a great help for the cause of peace if British diplomacy could succeed in making the German government believe that in spite of the Triple Alliance Austria’s fidelity could no more be depended upon in the event of a crisis - brought on by them - than that of Italy. To achieve this it would be necessary to familiarize the public with the idea that Austria’s power has been misjudged and that after all she is strong enough to work out her,destinies for herself, and that she is justified in handling the rapier as a master and in giving up playing the effaced role of the ‘Sekundant’, alluded to in the Kaiser’s telegram to Count Goluchowski at the close of the Algeciras Conference. Should Great Britain follow a policy something like the one sketched above, she would not be pursuing one intended to crush Germany, but one which would force her to join a genuine league of peace, which, if created, would be for the benefit of the world. By such a league I mean a union of all countries who, having adjusted their differences by diplomacy, show no desire for each other’s territories, and no intention of attempting to upset the status quo either by land or by sea. There should be no wish to exclude Germany from such a union, provided she gave genuine guarantees and showed a real desire to be satisfied with her present position in the world, and especially made it clear that she harboured no intention of upsetting the status quo by land or sea. This seems at present almost impossible of achievement, but the time may come when Germany wiR realize that the Great Powers are determined to maintain the balance of power in Europe, even at the risk of a war, and that war for her would probably mean disaster. The day this is thoroughly understood at Berlin it will be possible to talk of a practical solution of the question of limitation of armaments. We would then be returning more or less to the state of things which existed for nearly forty years in
