Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 35. (1982)
WILSON, Keith: Isolating the Isolator. Cartwright, Grey and the seduction of Austria-Hungary 1908–1912
178 Keith Wilson England . . . The present invitation to conclude an agreement represents a renewed effort in the same ultimate direction’42). At their end, at the time of Haldane’s visit to Berlin in February 1912, Sir Nicolson wrote to Bertie: ‘Of course the idea at the back of the German mind, Emperor and Chancellor, Ballin and Cassell, is to detach us from our friends .. ,’43). Sandwiched in between, the Agadir crisis was just one of the many occasions when the staff of the Foreign Office jumped to the same conclusion, immediately accounting for it in terms of Germany’s desire ‘to detach England from France’, her ‘determination to separate England and France at any cost’44). ‘The real inwardness’ of the German move, wrote Tyrrell, was ‘to test the Anglo-French entente. It should be viewed from that point of view alone!’45). Cartwright might deny that he thought it ‘either desirable or possible to draw away Austria-Hungary from her alliance with Germany’. But his scheme - of laying ties between Austria, Britain, France, Italy and Russia, ties ‘which in a critical moment may counteract the great pull from Berlin’; and of establishing a line between London, Paris and Vienna along which no friction would exist, so that just as England and France were in a position to restrain Russia if relations were strained between St Petersburg and Vienna, so Austria might be able to restrain Germany if trouble arose between Germany and France or England — could, if successfully pursued, have had little other result than the increased isolation and further encirclement of Germany. Hardinge was being something other than ingenuous when, in March 1910, he defended the ambassador in Vienna against press attacks by saying: ‘the desire to isolate Germany has always been attributed to Cartwright, but absolutely without reason’46). Certainly Cartwright was notorious, by the time this démenti was issued, for what the French Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna called his grand design — T’isolement de l’Allemagne par l’infidelité de l’Autriche’47). Nevertheless, despite the sending to Vienna of a man whose views on policy were well known and whose propensities might have been predicted; despite the accolades his work received, and the satisfaction displayed by Grey with the good personal relations established with Aehrenthal, the fact is that Germany was ‘let down easy’. She was let down easy not only by the Liberal government but also by the Foreign Office (Tyrrell was frequently not in a condition to lend Cartwright’s views sustained support)48). Why was 42) BD 6 (1930) 266: Minute by Crowe 19 April 1909. 43) PRO FO 800/171 (Bertie MSS): Nicolson to Bertie 8 February 1912. 44) Hardinge MSS vol. 92: Nicolson to Hardinge 5, 27 July 1911; BD 7 (1932) 332, 364: Minutes by Crowe 4, 15 July 1911. 45) Hardinge MSS vol. 92: Tyrrell to Hardinge 21 July 1911. 46) PRO FO 371/827/9186: Minute by Hardinge 16 March 1910. 47) Ministern des Affaires Etrangéres, Commission de Publication des Documents relatifs aux origines de la Guerre de 1914 Documents Diplomatiques Frangais (1871-1914) (= DDF) 2e Série 12 (1954) no. 462: St. Aulaire to Pichon 16 March 1910. 48) PRO FO 800/184 (Bertie MSS): Lee to Bertie received 4 June 1908.
