Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 34. (1981)

BRIDGE, Francis Roy: Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in the Twentieth Century

Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman empire

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This pattern continued during the war as the Germans, intent above all on victory and taking very little thought for the morrow, steadily extended their obligations to Turkey simply in order to keep her in the war. In January 1915, for example, in re-defining the casus foederis, they agreed to drop the restrictive adjective ‘non provoquée’ as applied to attacks on Turkey by the Entente Powers or by a coalition of Balkan states1613). The Austrians, by contrast, were mindful not merely of present concerns but of the prospect of living cheek by jowl with Turkey and the Balkan states after the war was over161 162). Berchtold at once objected that Austria-Hungary, as a neighbour of three Balkan states, would always be much more directly affected than Gér- many by disturbances in that quarter, and could hardly bind her hands for the future. Pallavicini stiffened his resistance, emphasizing, moreover,

‘daß man eben mit der türkischen Mentalität rechnen müsse. Wenn sich die Türken sicher fühlen, daß sie unter allen Umständen in einem jeden Konflikte von uns und Deutschland unterstützt werden müssen, so werden sie diese Situation ausnützen, um diese drei [Entente] Mächte in jeder erdenklichen Weise zu chicanieren, und werden in Fragen der fremden Schulen, der Rechte der Fremden etc. Maßnahmen ergreifen, die auch unseren Interessen zuwiderlaufen’163).

It was becoming increasingly clear to him, the more the Turks insisted,

‘wie notwendig es ist zu vermeiden, daß der Türkei durch den fraglichen Vertrag . . . freie Hand gegeben werde, alles zu tun, was ihr beliebt. . . . Nicht allein die Regierung würde einen solchen Freibrief ausnützen, um die anderen Staaten durch die verschiedensten Zwischenfälle zu provocieren, sondern auch die Unterbehörden würden die Situation auszunützen verstehen, . . . und sollte es über solche Zwischenfälle zu einem Kriege kommen, hätten wir die Pflicht, die Türkei zu unterstützen’164).

It was not until March, when the Dardanelles expedition threatened to knock Turkey out of the war, that the Austrians acceded to the Turco-German alliance of 11 January. And even then they confined themselves to the less solemnly binding diplomatic form of an exchange of notes; and insisted on the proviso that if the alliance were to continue after the war, the limitations and conditions of Austria-Hungary’s obligations would have to be closely defined in a separate military convention165).

It was no wonder, therefore, that the Turks, rightly fearing opposition in Vienna, did not initiate the Austrians into the negotiations when, in September 1916, they took advantage of Roumania’s entry into the war to extract from Berlin a commitment not to make peace without Turkey’s consent if Turkish territory were in enemy occupation166). The Austrians, for their

161 *) PA I 521: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 3P, 7 January 1915.

162) pjY j 52i: Berchtold to Pallavicini, telegram 918, 26 December 1914.

163) p/i j 581; Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 14P, 18 February 1915; PA I 521: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 79 A, 21 December 1914.

164) PA I 521: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 3P, 7 January 1915.

165) PA I 581: Pallavicini to Berchtold, No. 22 P, 18 March 1915.

166) PA I 522: Pallavicini to Burián, telegram 452, 29 September 1916; No. 74A-P, 29 September 1916.