Braun Tibor, Schubert András (szerk.): Szakértői bírálat (peer review) a tudományos kutatásban : Válogatott tanulmányok a téma szakirodalmából (A MTAK Informatikai És Tudományelemzési Sorozata 7., 1993)
IAN I. MITROFF and DARYL E. CHUBIN: Peer Review at the NSF: A Dialectical Policy Analysis
131 MITROFF & CHUBIN: PEER REVIEW AT THE NSF work accrues more advantages (that is, disproportionately) than those lacking such a good reputation. This cumulates over time so that the 'rich get richer'. The Political Model stipulates that certain elite scientists at elite institutions have disproportionately more access (a) to other élite scientists and scarce scientific resources (for example, information and research funding) and (b) to governmental agencies such as NSF, where they exert influence on science policy and its implementation in their roles as gatekeeper, advisor, and peer reviewer. 7 1 Finally, the Merit Model states that the work of a scientist is judged primarily on its merit, that research monies are awarded competitively according to universalistic criteria which favour, above all, the applicant's current ability to perform. 7 2 We hasten to add that merit is a component in each of these models, but is differentially weighted. Again, in terms of the universalism-particularism continuum, we predict that particularistic factors (that is, attributes of the scientist) tend to predispose reviewers to favourable evaluation of the scientist's work. This emphasis is typically an outgrowth of prior, and oftrepeated, evaluation of that scientist's other work as meritorious. Unlike the Merit Model, both the Accumulative Advantage and Political Models recognize this 'contamination' of evaluations. Alternatively put, these models treat discrete research products (for example, a new proposal or book) as continuous in time or imbued with the quality (fixed at a certain threshold, it would seem) of its producer. In brief, evaluation of research is highly contingent on its source. Adherents of these two models would insist that supporting such researchers — 'the best' — is functional for the system; therefore, favourable peer review of the research in question should follow suit. Those operating on the Political Model would rely more on particularistic-factors than on merit of the specific proposal in recommending disposition. Reviewers enamoured of Accumulative Advantage would attend somewhat less to the credentials of the researcher and more to the substance of the proposed research. Finally, those utilizing merit as the chief criterion of funding support would resort to proposal details per se, far more than to characteristics of its author. These models, then, capture the tension inherent in the reviewer role — a tension which encompasses both the discharge of the particular reviewing task and the overarching mentality one brings to the task. 7 3 How, then, have these models been applied to studies of the peer review process? In Hensler's study, none of the three models
