Nagy-L István szerk.: Pápai Múzeumi Értesítő 11. (Pápa, 2006)
Haderő és hadviselés 1809-ben - DAVID HOLLINS: Ausztria vezérleti rendszere - a modern szervezet eredete
DAVID HOLLINS AUSTRIA'S COMMAND STRUCTURE THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN MODEL When we consider army command structures, there is a historical problem, which is mostly connected with the wars of the 20th century. It is generally accepted that the Prussian army's organisation directed by Moltke is the basis of the modern system, but the shadow of Prussian militarism has led English-speaking and French historians to look for something earlier and they turned to Napoleon. He was after all very successful - for a few years and won stunning victories. The fact that many of these were over Germanic and Russian armies, while it was an English speaker, who triumphed at Waterloo, has however clouded a proper examination of how these armies functioned. The success and failure of armies in battle can often largely be determined by their command structure. Tn the Napoleonic wars, the biggest problem facing all commanders was the rapidly growing size of the armies hey led. In a time of military transition, the roots can be found of the modern command structure - perhaps not where it might be expected. The Napoleonic Model It is widely believed that one man represented the new military system Napoleon Bonaparte, later Emperor of France - but in reality he was the last of the warrior princes, who led his men into battle under his own direction. The received wisdom is that by his command system, he was able to direct huge armies to win successive victories. Operating far from the unstable Paris governments as Army commander in Italy and Egypt, Napoleon had been in effect an independent commander. He was able to direct military policy himself, provided the wagons of loot continued to roll back to France, and largely established the terms of the Peace of Campo Formio, which concluded the War of the First Coalition in 1797. After 1801, answerable to noone, he could mix military and political requirements as head of state on campaign. France had also abandoned any kind of permanent staff corps in 1790 and relied on men being rotated out of the line, often just the men, whom their commanders wanted to get rid of. This men performed the administrative tasks in the command, while the real work was done by Napoleon himself, who directed planning and dealt with important