H. Bathó Edit – Gecse Annabella – Horváth László – Kaposvári Gyöngyi szerk.: Tisicum - A Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok Megyei Múzeumok Évkönyve 16. (2007)

Szolnok Castle During the Rákóczi War Of Independence

for a short period, but in a long war it did not look promising. The fate of Szolnok Castle is a good example of this. Szolnok fell to Rákóczi'

s hand on 21

st September, 1703 after a short but bloody siege. The Kuruc slaughtered not only the few German-Hungarian guards, but their family members as well. The fort was out-of-date, in a bad condition and poorly equipped, but still it counted as the only fortification of the Mid-Tisza region. This duality explains that when the Kuruc military management was organised, Szolnok became one of the five nationwide regional captaincy districts, and the only one in the Plain, but it also explains why it could act as such only for half a year. By possessing Szolnok, the conduct of war should have had to carry out four tasks: 1. to organise a presidiary of proper strength and operational value and to provide support; 2. to modernise and restore the castle, to provide with war chariots and supplies; 3. to put the surrounding areas in the economical and political framework of the Kuruc state; and 4. to protect the Lowland from the raids of the Rác and Serb border guards of the Maros area, who stayed loyal to the Emperor. Unfortunately, they could not manage to perform any of these responsibilities successfully. In 1704 Rákóczi's French artificer officers suggested the demolition of the old Szolnok castle and the construction of a new Vauban-style fortification. The construction was started, but due to wartime circumstances, it proceeded very slowly and inefficiently. By the autumn of 1705, the old fortress had been battered down, but they hardly managed to erect half of the new one. Therefore even the completed fortification elements were not defensible. Some 2-300 troops were placed in the fort, and the undisciplined, poorly trained troops were frequently changed, and their operational value was quite low. They were beaten several times by the Serb border guards, and they could not prevent the fall of the Tiszántúl region. The frequent change of commanders did not made the situation better either. The war chariots, and supplies were often used for the fighting against the Serbs and to defend the Dunántúl region, so shortage was rather common. In 1705 the imperial troops setting off against Transylvania evaded the castle of Szolnok, because they were not aware of its ongoing problems. But a year later not even luck could help. At the beginning of August, 1706, the main imperial pivot forces set off towards west from Transylvania under the command of the much feared general Jean Louis Rabutin de Bussy (1642—1717). He had some 20,000 troops at his disposal; about third of them were Danish units. Rabutin crossed the Tisza at Csongrád on 1

st September and marched towards Szolnok. The Kuruc assembled considerable forces here under the command of General Bercsényi, and Sándor Károlyi, but because the imperial forces were superior in numbers, the rebels did not stand an open battle. Finally, on 1

st and 2

nd September, Károlyi abandoned the fort, which was incapable of resisting a systematic siege, and then burnt it down along with the bridges and the town. The imperial forces marched in the town on the 4

th September, and Rabutin's artificer officers fortified the castle in a week. A garrison of some 800 soldiers stayed here commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Delgano, while the main forces started off on the 10* September against the Felvidék region in the north. The quick reconstruction of Szolnok surprised Rákóczi. There was a threat that the imperial forces would cut off the Kuruc supply routes in the in the Plain and the Mátra hills and the Hegyalja area would be attacked as well. Rabutin, after his unsuccessful campaign in Felvidék, marched against Debrecen; then in January, 1707 he withdrew his men from Szolnok and had the castle and the town pulled down again. Szolnok lay in ruins for nearly three years. By 1710 the Rákóczi War of Independence was on the decline. After several severe defeats, the Kuruc state and army were beginning to break up, and they undertook fewer and fewer open battles. Rákóczi wanted to stop the imperial troops superior in number with a system of castles. He meant to fortify Gyöngyös, Hatvan and Jászberény, but due to insufficient resources, he could only rebuilt Szolnok. It was not a big, up-to-date fortress, with a few hundreds of personnel, it was meant to resist smaller sieges only. During the spring they estimated that the construction would take 2 months, but they were badly mistaken. The economically exhausted population of the Plain, decimated by pestilence, could not possibly provide sufficient manpower and food. In the middle of the summer, Rákóczi appointed Brigadier János Csajághy (1673—1712) to commander of the garrison, and entrusted him with the supervision of the further constructions. Csajághy, although among heavy difficulties, managed to complete the bulk of the work by mid-October, but he could not resist the hefty attack of the imperial forces. After the fall of Érsekújvár late September, 1710, the imperial army launched an all-in campaign against the remaining Kuruc territories. General Jacob Josef Cusani marched against Szolnok with a force of 10,000. The troops in the fort consisted of 400 men only, but Rákóczi concentrated 15 Kuruc regiments commanded by Field Marshall Sándor Károlyi to secure Szolnok. The only problem was that instead of 15,000 they only counted 3,000 troops. Cusani reached Szolnok on 15

th October. The cavalry sent by Károlyi ran away, and the remainder soldiers panicked. Although Csajághy managed to restore the order temporarily, after the 2-day bombing from the imperial artillery, he was forced to surrender. Later he pleaded that his men had been scared and the fortress had not been defensible against heavy siege shells. The events in and around Szolnok convinced FieldMarshal Sándor Károlyi about the total disintegration and disastrous state of the Kuruc military power. Presumably as a result of his personal experiences, from then on he tried to come to an arrangement with the imperial forces. 295