Levéltári Közlemények, 38. (1967)

Levéltári Közlemények, 38. (1967) 2. - FORRÁSKÖZLÉS - Karsai Elek: Iratok a Smuts-misszió történetéhez / 237–249. o.

Iratok a Smuts-misszió történetéhez 239 A Forradalmi Kormányzótanács nem táplált illúziókat a nagyhatalmak magatartása felől, _ válasza ügyes, taktikus volt. Hogy ez a külpolitika nem vezetett eredményre és mégis fegyveres intervencióra került sor, annak magyarázata tehát nem a Forradalmi Kormányzótanács — és ha úgy tetszik, személy szerint Kun Béla — hibás külpolitikai állásfoglalásában keresendő. 1. Párizs, 1919. április 7, Balfour, a párizsi konferencián résztvevő angol delegáció vezetője teljes terjedelmében táviratilag továbbítja a Háborús Kabinetnek Smuts tábornok április 4-i budapesti táviratának első részét. CIRCULATED TO THE KING AND WAR CABINET. FRANCE. Decypher. Mr. Balfour (Astoria, Paris), April 7th, 1919. D. 1.25 p. m. April 7th, 1919. R. 4.00 p. m. April 8th, 1919. No. 653. Very Urgent. ' To War Cabinet. In continuation of my telegram 650 following is General Smuts telegram 1 April 4th. Begins. I arrived at Budapest this morning and had long conversation with Beia Kuhn (sic!) who in consequence of change in Hungarian Government yesterday is now Chief Commissary both for War and Foreign Affaire and probably most important man in the Government. I pressed him to order withdrawal of troops to lines notified by Vix and I explained the selection of that line was not (group undecypherable

a

) political frontier and that withdrawal and creation of neutral zone under allied occupation would not in any way prejudice Hungarian case but was necessary for maintenance of peace and good order. He replied that withdrawal was impossible mainly for two reasons. First: defence of territory in question was (? conduct) by local troops who were mostly Szekler (group undecypherable) and over whom hold of Budapest Government was but small. Government could not enforce order to withdraw which would not be obeyed. They could not therefore undertake liability which they knew they were not in a position to fulfil. I have ascertained from many reliable sources that authority of Government is confined in the main to the town of Budapesth and is but slight in provinces and above difficulty against (? evacuation) is probably well founded. Secondly: although present Hungarian Government did not attach much importance to territorial boundaries large section of the population did, and compliance with Vix's orders would mean immediate fall of Government just as mere demand proved fatal to Karolyi Government. If Entente insisted on withdrawal Government would resign and chaos would ensue, as there is no party capable of forming another Government. Entente must in (? that) case be prepared to occupy not only neutral zone but also Buda Pesth and other parts and run the country on their own responsibility. I pointed out advantages to Hungary of removal of blockade and establishment of friendly relations with the Entente Powers which would give the country a chance to live and recover. But Armistice had to be carried out and final political frontiers could be settled at later stage. Bela Kuhn (sic!) said they adhered to Armistice and wished for friendly relations with Powers but evacuation at present stage not possible for above reasons. With regard to future territorial boundaries Hungarian Government did not adhere to former Hungarian imperialism and former ideas of territorial integrity. They (? recognise) a Fölötte kézírással: ? definite.