Papers and Documents relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Volume 2, 1921 (Budapest, 1946)

Documents

1921 3 faced solely with a decision of the Allies.

1 Had the Austrian Government given tangible evidence of its intention to settle this issue amicably by entering into negotiations with Hungary and had the Allies thereafter vetoed such an amicable settlement, everybody in Hungary would put the blame for the loss of the Burgenland not on Austria, but on the Allies. The inevitable consequence of the evacuation of the Burgenland would be immeasurable bitterness of feeling in Hungary, and normal economic relations would be gravely compromised. For these reasons I urged the Chancellor not to regard the question of the Burgenland as conclusively settled by the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors, but to open the way for negotiations between Austria and Hungary with a view to an amicable settlement. Chancellor Mayr declared that he would welcome such negotiations; but that, in his opinion, these could deal only with minor frontier rectifications, such as for instance whether Nagycenk should belong to Austria or Hungary. I replied that the political objective I had in view could not be attained by negotiations restricted to frontier rectifications. I conceded that since a large section of Austrian public opinion regarded the Burgenland question as res judicata

, the Austrian Government would have great difficulty in putting forward that question as the purpose of these negotiations. On the other hand, it would be equally difficult for the Hungarian Government to enter into negotiations the sole purpose of which would be insignificant frontier rectifications, for it would thereby recognize that the substance of the issue had already been settled. It would be feasible, however, for both parties to enter into negotiations concerning not merely Western Hungary but all questions arising out of the Peace Treaty, including Hungary's claims against Austria. Chancellor Mayr said that if I was referring to the division of Crown property or of property owned in common by the former Monarchy, he could readily agree to open negotiations on this question in the immediate future. These negotiations must, however, include consideration of both the credit and the debit ledgers. 1 Cf. Vol. I, Docs. Nos. 756, 776, 782, 795, 818. 1*